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Cardenismo or PAN?
Jonathan Fox's "Towards Democracy
in Mexico?" (Hemisphere,Winter
1989) is a provocative article. I agree
with Fox that "Mexican politics will
never be the same," but for a different reason.
Fox gives excessive importance to
the "Cardenas phenomenon." The
Cardenas buildup was orchestrated
by the government-controlled news
media. Even the "official" results
of the presidential election had a
purpose: to scare the US State Department. The message was "Either help
the PRI stay in power or the communists will take over Mexico."
Future events will prove that Mexico's evolution to democracy owes
more to PAN's 50 years of consistent
struggle than to the politics of Cardenas or other sporadic forces.
Norberto Corella
Secretario de Relaciones
Partido Acci6n Nacional
Mexico, DF

Different Stories
The database (or lack thereof) and
sweeping characterizations in John V
Lombardi's "Stories of Foreign Language" (Hemisphere,Summer 1989)
normally would not incite me to
answer it were it not for the fact that
the author is a leading SpanishAmerican academic and a senior
administrator at one of the nation's
major research universities. I should
like to believe that Lombardi was
mainly addressing the unsatisfactory
ways in which foreign languages
have been taught, or continue to be
taught, on those campuses that he
has had a chance to observe personally. Only then would some generalizations, such as his statement
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regarding the "hammerlock" control
that literature faculty allegedly exercise on language teaching, make
sense. While this may be true in some
cases, especially in private universities and some public universities,
there clearly have been serious
attempts on other campuses to correct such unfortunate structural
deficiencies.
The intimate correlation between
the teaching of language and culture
has resulted in variedly successful
applications of proficiency-oriented
curricula and the rebuilding of foreign language faculty and programs.
Such corrections include, but are
not restricted to, a strong buildup of
undergraduate and graduate language/applied linguistics courses
and a hiring pattern that reflects the
need for a redefined curricular balance. The vast majority of our faculty
members consistently teach both language and culture/literature or linguistics courses, while attaining and
maintaining in several instances
national or international reputations
in their respective fields. There are
numerous other curricular and personnel actions, including a lively outreach orientation (Latin American
studies, African studies, general linguistics, etc.), that can be advanced
as strong evidence of a response
beyond paying mere lip service to the
needs that Lombardi so eloquently
portrays. In the interest of presenting a differentiated view of the teaching of foreign languages and cultures
in the US, I am sending this informal
response to his very partially
informed essay.
Raymond Gay-Crosier
Professor and Chair
Department of Romance Languages
and Literatures
University
of
Florida
Univ....t.
of Flor...

John V. Lombardi's "Stories of Foreign Language" takes an indiscriminate swipe at the foreign language
profession from the perspective of
an academic administrator and with
the pique of a social scientist. Unfortunately, while Lombardi's piece
accurately reflects the view of several
years ago and of the institutions with
which he has been associated most
recently, it misstates some crucial
facts.
First of all, "deans and other sensitive administrators" are not responsible for the changes in the foreign
language profession, nor is the sociologist who heads the foreign language center at Johns Hopkins (I
decline to say "think tank" because
Lombardi claims "language is a relatively straightforward skill," and
thinking is a devious enterprise that
might obfuscate the language-learning process). The foreign language
profession has been in the midst of a
quiet revolution, and major changes
in the methodology, measurement,
and purpose of language instruction
have taken place. Secondly, Lombardi attributes to the profession the
expressed intents of the National
Defense Education Act and the
newer Education for Economic Security Act, when these were developed
by social scientists and politicians.
Thirdly, Lombardi believes the profession is not a panacea for America's
economic woes, but that because he
naively believed it at one time, it has,
therefore, perpetrated a fraud. True,
foreign languages cannot manufacture better cars, but Lombardi

should try to sell them in English to
the Europeans or the Latin
Americans.
In any case, it seems clear that
Lombardi should stick to history, his
own discipline, and not to the revisionism of the story of foreign languages that he falsifies in the telling.
Would that it were one of the minor
novellas of Cervantes: then we could
move to rectify it.
RodolfoJ Cortina
Professor of Modern Languages
Florida International University
Project Director, Foreign Language
Instruction in Florida Project
Editor'sNote:John V.Lombardi,
author of "Stories of Foreign Language" and provost and vice president
of Academic Affairs at TheJohns
Hopkins University, was appointed
in November 1989 as presidentof the
University of Florida, Gainesville.
Lombardi will assume his new post
following the springsemester of 1990.

Hemispheric Debate
I appreciate the thoughtful reviews
of Partnersin Conflict by Mark
Falcoff and Rosario Green (Hemisphere, Summer 1989), each from
a different political perspective.
In the spirit of continued collegial
exchange, I wish to comment on two
specific aspects of Falcoffs review
with which I take issue.
Falcoff asserts that I fail to realize
that "we (i.e. the US) are still important"; that I believe "the US is pur-

suing its national self-interest only
when it is doing what the Latin American nations want"; and that I
"deplore any and all differences
between Washington and the Latin
American capitals." These comments
are unwarranted. I affirm repeatedly, in different ways, that the US is
"still by far the strongest nation of
the Americas" (p. 46), but I argue
that to pursue our own interests successfully in a period of declining predominance, we need to understand
those interests better and also to
understand the interests and conceptions of the Latin American nations.
We cannot take Latin American
acquiescence for granted on the
basis of hegemony or presumed
regional harmony; we must treat
Latin American nations as real
states, as we do European nations.
This argument by no means presumes that conflict with Latin American nations is inherently negative or
that it should be avoided by Washington's giving in to every Latin American demand. On the contrary, the
thrust of Partners-mademost
explicit in the chapters on Brazil and
Mexico-is that the first step toward
effective policy is to recognize that
conflict is natural and expected, and
that it must be more effectively managed. Note the last two paragraphs
of chapter four, for example, or the
middle paragraph on page 128 in the
Brazil chapter and the following
paragraph, or the final paragraph on

page 135.
Falcoffs review is substantially

unfair in alleging that Partners
"often oversimplifies policy choices,
as if they were strictly discrete."
Surely my book, like any brief discussion, oversimplifies policy choices to
some degree-but I simply do not
recognize the false dichotomies listed
on page 44 of the review as drawn
from or based upon my book; Falcoff
here conflates his quarrel with a
whole lot of analysts (and perhaps
with some of my own op-ed polemics)
with the more nuanced argument
advanced in Partners.
Falcoff and I do have real differences, some of which emerge in his
review. To cite only three points, I
have a different analysis and appreciation of the security issues in the
hemisphere from his; I do not believe
that Latin America's perceived significance to the US will disappear if and
when the American public and the
Congress diminish their concern
with the supposed military security
threat from Latin America; and I
have a higher estimate of Latin
America's economic significance and
potential than he.
These and other differences of
analysis should be explored in the
mutually respectful tone that marks
Falcoffs review and that I hope characterizes my own writing most of
the time.

Abraham E Lowenthal
Executive Director
The Inter-American Dialogue
Washington, DC

Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor.Letters must be typed double-spaced, and are
subject to editingfor clarity and length.
Pleaseaddress letters to: The Deputy Editor,Hemisphere, Latin American and Caribbean
Center FloridaInternationalUniversity, University Park,Miami, FL 33199;
FAX (305)348-3593.
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Bush's First Stand
by RobertJ.Kurz

Gorbachev's Impact
been blowing through Central America with the force
of a Caribbean hurricane,
shaking and in some cases
blowing away the region's old
structures of international
relations. The pressures giving rise
to these powerful winds emanate
more from the political currents of
Moscow and Washington than from
those of Central America, but it is
the Central Americans who must face
the consequences.
In Moscow the demise of the
Brezhnev doctrine and the breakup
of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe
sent a political message to Cuba and
Nicaragua, even if they hadn't quite
decided how to respond. In Washington the Reagan doctrine seemed to
yield to the Bush administration's
pragmatism, including a clear effort
to drop Central America several pegs
on the priority chart. The Central
American allies of Moscow and
Washington were watching and wondering what their foreign patrons are
likely to do.
Even as the predictability of the
Cold War evaporates, the tradition of
Central American instability and US
intervention continues. Regardless of
the Bush administration's original
inclination about Central America,
the US invasion of Panama in
December 1989 returned that region
with a vengeance to the forefront of
the Washington policy agenda. The
invasion did not arise from US
entanglements with the USSR, Cuba,
or Nicaragua, but from the deterioration of US relations with a former
friend and ally in Panama.
RobertJ Kurz is a guest scholar at the
Brookings Institution and a Council
on ForeignRelations Fellow.
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If Mikhail Gorbachev's policies are
encouraging revolution, it is not in
the Third World but in Eastern
Europe. Fidel Castro is more than
capable of resisting the pressure for
change, as his words and actions indicate. Yet he cannot but have noticed
the deft Soviet handling that dispatched another voice of resistance,
East Germany's Eric Honecker, from
the political scene. The new Soviet
thrust of defusing rather than
exploiting conflicts in Latin America
and the Caribbean is further reducing Castro's latitude for action. All
this has not been lost on the Sandinistas, who have been heard to talk
about the "black hand of perestroika"
and wonder aloud about meeting the
leaders of the Nicaraguan business
community at the Soviet Embassy.
Imagine the reaction of the Sandinista hardliners when they discovered the Soviets offered to begin
funding the Instituto Centroamericano
de la Administraci6n de Empresas: a
US-sponsored business administration school established in Managua
during the Somoza years. Equally
telling are Sandinista complaints
about their dependence on Soviet
arms.
There are other indicators of this
trend. Parts of the US intelligence
community publicly confirm the
Soviet claim that they have halted
arms shipments to the Sandinistas.
Further, during his October 1989
visit to Managua, Soviet foreign minister Edward Shevardnadze repeatedly mentioned the suspension of
heavy-weapon deliveries, while seeking to emphasize commercial trade.
During the September 1989 summit
meeting in Wyoming between
Shevardnadze and Secretary of State
James Baker, a joint statement was

quietly issued that called for ending
military aid to irregular or rebel
forces in Central America and for
free and fair elections in the region.
Thus, after a decade of US worry
about the Sandinistas and Soviet
control of Nicaragua, it turns out
that Moscow is no happier about its
role in Managua than is Washington.
If this trend holds, it will both reassure Washington that its worst fears
were unfounded and erode the Cold
War status quo in Central America.

Bush's Stand
For Ronald Reagan, Central America
was a place to crusade, but George
Bush came to office downplaying the
region's importance. His October
1989 visit to Costa Rica to honor that
country's democracy and its president Oscar Arias was a stark rejection of Reagan's hostility toward the
Arias peace plan. The Bush administration regarded Central America
as the scene of Reagan failure, a
reminder of the Iran-contra scandal,
and an unwelcome link with Panama's Manuel Noriega.
For most of Bush's first year in
office, the pragmatic iron fist of Secretary of State Baker pushed Central
America out of the administration's
way. Pragmatism, however, did not
provide a road map for dealing with
trouble in places like El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Panama. The Bush
circle did not warmly receive public
statements by insiders concerning
the policy vacuum. Lt. General Fred
Woerner, one of the US military's
true Latin America experts, paid
with his career for calling attention
to the lack of a policy anchor in Panama. Simply put, there was no clear
picture of what the Bush administration wanted to accomplish in Central
America, nor was there a plan for

Y

ending that region's conflicts. That
Bush could meet with all the democratic leaders of Latin America without producing a joint statement,
much less proposing action on
drugs, debt, or democracy, was indicative of Washington's policy paralysis.
In December 1989 the Bush
administration reversed itself. By
sending 24,000 US combat soldiers
to unseat Noriega, the administration made Central America a priority
in a way that even Reagan was unwilling to do. Initially both the Bush
administration and the US public
were euphoric about taking on
Noriega. In spite of more than a decade of US support for the growth of
Noriega's power, he had become the
personification of evil: a drug kingpin, a torturer, and a murderer.
Because of Noriega's unraveling
relations with the US, and the legitimacy of the Guillermo Endara government that grew out of Panama's
May 1989 presidential election, the
American people are sure to rally in
support of Bush's use of military
force. Still, the excitement of the
chase is likely to give way to the cold,
hard facts of the new US responsibilities in Central America. For virtually the first time in the 86 years of
its involvement in Panama, Washington finds itself responsible for
providing many of that country's government services. In addition,
despite claims that the US is "restoring democracy," the difficult truth is
that Panama's government has never
been democratic. Helping the Panamanian people with the enormous
tasks of establishing a democratic
government and revitalizing their
crippled economy is easier said than
done. This is particularly true as, in
light of the US deficit-based budget
squeeze and diminished rivalry with

the USSR, the US public's support

for Latin American aid in general is
being eclipsed. Consequently US
dealings with Latin America suffer
from limited resources.
Further complicating the Bush
administration's Central American
picture is the violent reality in El Salvador. The potent guerrilla offensive
has proved a barbed reminder that
the war in El Salvador drags on,
while the blood of the six murdered
Jesuit priests has defiled the legitimacy of Salvadoran democracy.
In short the Bush administration
was initially less interested in Central
America than was its predecessor. It
attempted to abandon the Reagan
approach, but ultimately deepened
US intervention in the region. As the
Bush team struggles to manage this
heightened responsibility, it finds
itself constrained by severe budget
problems.

Central American Reality
After a decade of several billion
dollars in foreign assistance, it is
troubling to see how little Central
America's social, economic, and political structures have changed. Publicly available data from the CIA
indicate the region's living standards
remain depressingly constant.
Despite talk of a "democratic tide,"
matters such as civilian control and
political freedom remain subordinate to the power and privileges of
the military, whose buildup has been
financed by US and Soviet aid.
Regional peace initiatives, as well as
Sandinista electoral concessions and
the aborted FMLN-ARENA discussions, demonstrate that many Central
Americans recognize the heavy price
they are paying for this stalemate:
widespread suffering and isolation
from international investment and

trade-all of which compound the
region's plight. But this does not
mean the wars will end.
In El Salvador the bloody stalemate continues, with neither the
army nor the guerrillas being capable
of winning and right-wing violence
going unchecked. Whatever the outside pressures may be, the violence
will continue.
In Panama the US is involved as
deeply as ever. In spite of widespread
Latin American sentiment against
Noriega, the region's reaction to the
invasion is less supportive than the
US people would like. The endurance
of the Endara government's legitimacy
will depend on its ability to remove
the US military from Panamanian
affairs, establish its own capacity
to govern, and revive the economy.
The result of all this is a fascinating irony. After decades of protest
about Soviet intervention in the
Caribbean Basin, the US is witnessing the USSR's gradual withdrawal. Yet this is occurring as
Washington-despite its desire to disengage from Central America-has
become more directly involved. However these realities may evolve, Central Americans must face their own
basic internal problems, not the least
of which are political rigidity and
repression.
Central America's harsh, unyielding political structure presents Washington with an almost insurmountable dilemma. Local conditions and
interests are producing renewed,
unwanted tensions between Washington and Moscow. Even as the superpowers agree to reduce their commit-

ments to the region, Central America
may not allow this to occur. The
tragedy is that while the Cold War is
winding down, US policy toward
Central America remains frustrating
and hot. a
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The Difficult Transition in the Caribbean
by Anthony P. Maingot

ideological and economic
transition. It is not clear
which is driving which.
What is clear is that the
transition appears irreversible over the short to
medium term and that it is accompanied by very real political consequences. Clearly one of the factors
behind this transition is the failure of
the traditional economies. Hardly
anyone in the Caribbean doubts that
something different has to be tried.
The particular orientation this new
vision is taking, however, appears to
stem from two sources.
The first source is the failure of
Caribbean-based experiments with
centralized, state-driven strategies of
development. Whether it be Cuban
or Nicaraguan socialism, Guyana's
"cooperative socialism," or the
"mixed economy" experiments in
Jamaica and, to a lesser degree, Trinidad, the results have been disappointing. The second source is the
worldwide turn towards pragmatism
and pluralism. The historical openness and receptivity of the Caribbean
to world trends is showing itself to be
quite alive and well. Society has disregarded those Caribbean writers
who have so often scoffed at this easy
receptivity to new trends. For example, V. S. Naipaul could hardly dissimilate his disdain for a people he
labeled "mimic men" while Rene
Marquez lamented their traditional
"docility." But such derision hardly
changes the reality. This is evident in
a new political discourse throughout
the region. Today the political language is so radically different from
what it was in the 1970s that those
who persist in the language, ideas,
and metaphors of the 1970s suffer
the worst of ignominies in politics:
being disdained and ignored. The
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ideological and programmatic transformation of a Michael Manley is
merely the most visible sign of a
much deeper search for a less dogmatic and confrontational approach
to national development and international relations. Even a country such
as Guyana, where the government

has been less ready to relinquish military and political power, is no longer
adverse to entertaining the privatization of major sectors of the statecontrolled economy, dialoguing with
the US State Department, and-inconceivable a decade ago-negotiating loans from the IMF and World
Bank.

Pragmatism at Work
This new attitude towards the invariably unpopular IMF/World Bank
prescriptions-noticeable even in
Sandinista Nicaragua-is especially
revealing. Opposition to this foreign
"imperial" imposition was only a
decade ago a major battle cry of the
then-entrenched left. Today these
agencies are not only welcomed, but
their recommendations seem logical
extensions of local thinking. Witness
the tone of a recent Note from the
Trinidad and Tobago government

regarding a World Bank Appraisal
Mission Report: "The Minister of
Planning and Mobilization anticipates no special difficulty in reaching agreement with the World Bank
... since the action required is essentially what the Government itself has
already approved." In fact, the pragmatism of the Trinidadians went
beyond economics, demonstrating an
admirable capacity to leverage the
Bank's recommendation for internal
administrative reasons. As the Note
stated: "Acceptance of the proposal
... would merely enforce the discipline of implementation according to
the agreed time-table."
Not that there is no Caribbean
opposition to IMF-type reforms that
call for contraction in public sector
expenditures, discipline and moderation in labor's wage demands, and
receptivity to foreign investments.
There certainly is. In Trinidad, for
instance, it is one of the main themes
of the newly formed United National
Congress as well as assorted left-wing
groups. But this opposition, in Trinidad as elsewhere, is devoid of the
broad programmatic and ideological
framework that gave it political
sustenance and weight in the 1970s.
One explanation is the international demonstration effect: how to
oppose dealing with the IMF in
Trinidad when "cooperative socialist" Guyana and social-democratic
Jamaica are both following that
agency's strictures? Another explanation lies in the willingness to
understand some basic facts that
ideologically driven planning overlooked. Such is the case with the conventional radical opposition to
tourism, fearing the "penetration" of
detrimental ideas and customs. But
why oppose tourism when mass communications and the considerable
travel of Caribbean people them-

selves to these foreign centers are
even more effective means of cultural borrowing and transformation?
One example should make the point.
In 1981, while the radical rhetoric
against tourism was at its peak, two
Caribbean states, Trinidad and Barbados, saw 7% of their populations
visit the US. On a proportional basis,
that was 30 times the number of US
citizens who left their country to be
tourists in those two islands. Since
no country in the Caribbean except
Cuba would dare ban the foreign
travel of their citizens, the attack on
tourism was misplaced.
This new global and regional
pragmatism clearly presents the
area's leaders with opportunities to
try new development strategies. But
opportunities, like the proverbial
quest for more "time;" are a neutral
factor. It is what is done with those
opportunities that counts. The mere
acceptance of new economic and
political thinking is a vital first step.
There is a danger, however, that it
can become another ideological ploy,
no more useful than the socialist
rhetoric was in the 1960s and 1970s.
Indeed, there might be a danger in
an overstated rhetoric about the benefits of privatization and the workings of the market place. This is
especially true in a period of transition when contractions and structural adjustments create new
problems even as the old problems
persist. As their economies shift
towards services and assembly manufacturing, traditional exports (oil,
sugar, coffee, bananas) are still the
major exchange earners and
employers. Sugar-the area's largest
employer and third largest export
earner-is a case in point.

Tough Problems
While the handwriting has been on
the wall for a long time, the present
problems facing the sugar industry
are still traumatic. The 40% reduction in US imports in 1987 and the
further 25% reduction in 1988 cost
the region an estimated $500 million
and perhaps 40,000 jobs. To be sure,
the impact of this severe cutback in

employment and earnings has not
fallen evenly throughout the region.
Those with access to the EEC under
the L6me convention-viz. the
English-speaking Caribbean-were
shielded from the full effects of US
actions. Not so the Dominican
Republic, the largest sugar producer
in the Caribbean after Cuba.

and gist for the Dominican antiAmerican mill.
True, the Dominicans have not
been inactive. Taking advantage
of the new international climate, they
are trying to diversify their markets.
For instance, a new CubanDominican Chamber of Commerce
is actively pursuing mutually beneficial exchanges in the areas of sugar,
dairy, and meat production. More
important, there has been a diversification of crops on former sugar
cane lands into citrus and winter vegetables for local consumption and
export. It is calculated that US agricultural exports to the Dominican
Republic have declined by $60 million a year due to this diversification.
Additionally the Dominican Republic
has taken good advantage of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, even as
that worthy initiative and the 936
Twin Plant program have been great
disappointments in the region as a
whole. By 1988 Dominicans had some

225 companies employing 85,000

The Dominican Republic's loss in
employment has been calculated at
20,000 jobs. The joint effect of cuts
in US quotas (from 533,000 tons in
1984 to 176,710 in 1988) and low
world prices has meant that the $560
million earned from sugar exports in
1981 were reduced to $146 million in
1986 with further reductions in 1987.
The 10% increase in the 1988 quota
amounted to an insignificant 16,000
additional tons. In late 1989, faced
with a worldwide shortage of cane
sugar, the Dominican quota was
raised to 337,915 tons. Dominican
production will still be well below the
1.2 million tons produced in 1983. In
fact, it is a telling point that in 1987
the Dominicans sold 225,000 tons of
sugar to the USSR, an amount 50%

higher than the US 1987 quota of
160,160 tons. And the Soviets paid
55% above the market price. It is only
the defusing of the Cold War as well
as the changed Dominican politicalideological context that prevented
such a situation from turning into a
major plus for Soviet foreign policy

workers in free zones throughout the
nation.
A clear economic transition is on
its way. By 1987 manufacturing
(17.1%) had outstripped agriculture
(16.1%) as a contributor to GDP.
Another growth area has been tourism, which has been expanding at
more than 16% per year since 1970.
The island now has 18,758 hotel
rooms and is third (after Puerto Rico
and the Bahamas) in tourist arrivals.
On its face, thus, it is not a bad
performance.
Unfortunately there is a flip side
to the story. By 1987 the Dominican
Republic was spending 70% of its
export earnings on debt repayments
and the total debt grew from $3.1 bil-

lion in 1984 to $3.7 billion in 1988. In
this the Dominican Republic is little
different from the rest of the area.
Levels of unemployment, moreover,
have not yet been reduced by the
restructuring. In its attempt to deal
with the 30% unemployment rate,
the government ofJoaquin Balaguer
has undertaken enormous publicbuilding projects, financing these
through increased taxation and
import duties, devaluations, and, per-
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haps especially, printing more
money. Dominican inflation in 1988
was calculated at 60%.
The bloody riots that broke out
in the Dominican Republic in 1988
were not unlike those in Venezuela:
directly attributable to the declining
standard of living of the urban
masses. These were spontaneous outbursts, which, precisely because they
had no overall controlling groups
or organizations, were all the more
difficult to deal with. There are no
longer radical parties-in the Dominican Republic or elsewhere in the
Caribbean-capable of mobilizing
these slum dwellers. Nor is there an
overarching ideological framework
that rationalizes or justifies such violence. Rather than making us complacent, we should realize that this
not-so-latent anger of urban masses
experiencing enormous pressures
because of the national restructuring
is a Caribbean-wide phenomenon.
Complacency is even less excusable if
we realize that the potential for
social explosion is only one of the
characteristics of this period of economic and political transition.
Alongside the potential for such massive outbursts, there are three other
Caribbean-wide social and political
trends that seem to characterize this
period of transition.
The first is the widely held perception that the quality of life in the
region is deteriorating. From the
Dominican Republic down to Trinidad, people are complaining about
the cost of living, rampant crime,
decreasing health and educational
standards, and in vague, though no
less politically significant ways, about
a loss of faith in future improvements. The working classes grumble
about it, while the middle classes
demonstrate their loss of faith by
migrating in increasing numbers.
The latter invariably rationalize their
move as being "for the children's
future." Often unmentioned by the
middle classes is the fact that any ideology espousing pragmatism and
openness necessarily calls for more
individual initiative, competitiveness,
and a reduction in white-collar jobs
in the historically bloated public sec-

Hemisphere. Fall 1989

tor. Where this is accompanied-as is
the case in many a Caribbean city
-by constant electrical blackouts,
water shortages, and a mushrooming
informal sector occupying in helterskelter fashion every inch of sidewalk
space, nerves appear on collective

edge. Where historical divisions of
race and class exist, the new policies
might aggravate them by making the
adjustments seem discriminatory
and partisan. In short, there is a new
form of survival of the fittest, not
unlike what is found in major cities
elsewhere but one that contrasts
sharply with the traditionally tranquil and even genteel life of the
Caribbean middle classes.
Contributing to the sense of malaise of the middle class is rampant
corruption. There is, first and foremost, the corruption wrought by the
illicit trade in drugs. The Caribbean
has become a major transshipment
center for the US and Europe. Many
of the region's leaders now agree with
Michael Manley that the drug trade
represents the greatest threat to
their islands and the world. There is
growing sentiment in the region for
concerted action. But there is also
widespread administrative corruption. In Venezuela the misappropriations, not to say outright theft, are
counted in the billions of dollars, in

Trinidad in the hundreds of millions.
The amounts appear to reflect the
nature and size of the economies.
These are monies taken from development projects or military expenditures, and thus are materially
harmful to the futures of these
societies.
Also galling is the widespread
impunity that violation of the public
trust and monies appears to enjoy.
This situation clashes dramatically
with the religiosity and conservativeness of these societies. The recent
sentencing of an ex-president of the
Dominican Republic to 20 years in
jail, the trial of several ex-ministers
in Venezuela, and the Costa Rican
congressional report on administrative corruption in Costa Rica are
rare acts indeed. No society can bear
such internal tensions for long, which
explains why charges of corruption
tend to be the dominant theme of virtually every election in the region.
Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic continually asserts that he has
"manos limpias," knowing that the
claim contributes enormously to his
surprising new popularity, appealing
even to a middle class historically
skeptical of his populist intentions.
Contributing to this milieu of
economic and moral uncertainty are
the escalating crises in political party
structures in the region. Even the historically strong and united parties
have not escaped the divisions. The
PartidoRevolucionarioDominicano in
the Dominican Republic is now three
distinct parties. In Trinidad the formidable People's National Party split
into three parties, one of which
joined a victorious coalition that split
into two parties only months after
winning a landslide victory. The governing Democratic Labour Party in
normally staid and proper Barbados
split so badly that the splinter group
is now the official opposition in parliament. In Grenada the government
is virtually paralyzed because of
internal splits. In the Netherlands
Antilles there is a tenuous coalition
of six parties forming the federal government while on each of the islands
there is a bewildering array of parties
and coalitions.

But if the governing parties
appear to be prone to splintering,
the opposition is in even worse shape.
Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama are
clear aberrations from the Caribbean-wide shift to pluralist parliamentary politics, but even there the
opposition is characterized by its
divisiveness. In Haiti there are
perhaps 25 parties competing with
the military for state power; in
Nicaragua the opposition national
front is composed of 14 parties; in
Panama the courage and determination of deposed General Manuel
Noriega's opposition did not heal the
divisions between them, and their
tenure in government promises to be
equally fractured. In Guyana the
entrenched government ridicules the
five-party opposition coalition (the
Patriotic Coalition for Democracy),
noting that they cannot even agree
on a spokesperson to negotiate over
elections. In Suriname a weak and
ethnically splintered government
does not even have the power to con-

NEW

trol the corrupt and arrogant military clique still controlled by exdictator Colonel Desi Bouterse.

ANew Direction
There can be no doubt that the vast
majority of the Caribbean peoples
prefer democracy, with all its foibles,
to dictatorship. Whenever and wherever given a free choice, they have
opted for pluralism. There can be little doubt, however, that the present
crisis of confidence expressed most
articulately and persistently by the
region's middle classes and periodically but explosively by their
urban masses is not a situation to
take lightly. As welcome as the new
openness is, it is evident that the
accompanying trends have to be
understood and monitored. The
worst thing that can happen to any
system in transition-with all the
uncertainties and confusion that
accompany it-is that fundamental
components of the new policy initiative be either lacking or constantly in
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DEBT AND CRISIS
IN LATIN AMERICA
THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE STORY
Robert Devlin
"Devlin's book is a distinctive analysis of Latin
American debt problems, bringing out exceptionally well the structure of incentives acting on

lenders to push lending too far in the first place and
then to retract too drastically when troubles begin.
It helps especially to clarify the changing interests
of lenders in successive stages of renegotiation and
thereby to point up alternatives for debtors that
might lessen the strains of domestic contraction.
The author's deep concern for finding better
solutions keeps the book very much alive."
--John Sheahan, Williams College

doubt. The Caribbean has chosen a
new direction made compelling by
international trends and national
preferences. Merely adopting a new
ideology, however, does not guarantee the availability of all basic ingredients. Markets and capital have to
be competed for, and this competition, as the Caribbean is discovering,
is becoming ever more difficult.
It is obvious that there are problems, even hardships, ahead in this
transition. Yet there is also hope that
the new realism and pragmatism of
the Caribbean will see it through
these difficulties without any harm to
the admirable democracies they have
created. Most Caribbean leaders
have demonstrated that they understand two fundamental things about
today's realities: first, pluralist politics are the foundations of any true
development; and second, it is better
to confront those realities with all
their consequences than attempt to
avoid them through an adherence to
the status quo. .
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Cuba: JInflexibilidad Total?
by Damidn J Ferndndez

inflexibilidad!"while the
Berlin Wall comes tumbling
down. Neither Castro's rhetoric nor the dramatic events
in the Soviet bloc are appropriate lenses through which
to look at contemporary Cuban politics. To harp on the lider mdximo's
ideological rigidity or to use the
example of Eastern Europe as a
model for what awaits the island is to
miss two fundamental points. One,
changes have been taking place
inside Cuba, not as mere repercussions of external events but as a
result of internal dynamics. Two,
Cuban history, and the Cuban revolution specifically, have always been
atypical, and should not be cast in
the molds that fit other societies.

Island Currents
At first glance one would say that the
tide of reforms sweeping across the
communist world has not reached
Cuban shores. If one looks closer,
however, one sees not a wave but a
ripple of change. Although less sensational than the external developments, Cuba's internal developments
are important nonetheless. To begin
with, Cubans are increasingly willing
to express their dissatisfaction with
the way things function (or malfunction). Under the banner of rectificaci6n, the top leaders have admitted to
failures in the system. Utopia, contrary to 1960s prophesies, is not just
around the corner. Throughout the
island, at bus stops, in queues, and in
artists' workshops, people are finding
fault with Cuban conditions. They no
DamiinJ. Ferndndez is assistant
professorof internationalrelations at
FloridaInternationalUniversity.
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longer place the blame outside the
island (i.e., the US embargo) but on
factors within the revolution. The
artists, particularly the painters and
sculptors, have adopted a critical
stance, pushing the limits of selfexpression to levels unseen since the
1960s. A visit to the Sala del Humor
in the Museo Nacionalde Bellas Artes
reveals much more than the dark
side of the Cuban sense of the comic.
Independent social groups,
moreover, are staking their own
claims. Like the artists, the Church
has found in the late 1980s an assertive voice and is experiencing a
renaissance, as are the island's other
popular religions. A minuscule but
courageous human rights movement
is defying the odds to survive, as are
at least half a dozen other cultural,
religious, ecological, and political

groupings.

In addition Cuba's youth show
signs of restlessness. They are eager
to strike a conversation with an outsider, to offer to buy your jeans, and
to indict their society. The gulf
between those who rule-a gerontocracy, according to some critics
-and the younger generation worries the Communist Party. Young
Cubans are enraptured by the symbols of glasnost and perestroikarather
than the revolutionary myths of
yesteryear.
The ruling elite's ability to sustain
cohesion has been acquired at a high
price. The July 13, 1989, execution of
General Arnaldo Ochoa is one example. The defection of second-tier officials points to discord under the
surface of tranquility. Debate permeates the state and party organs, particularly over the issue of where to go
from here.
Within Cuba and abroad there is
consensus that the country must
change. The sentiment is that, at the
least, Cuba's political system will have
to accommodate the economic transformations under way in the Soviet
bloc. The questions are, how will
Cuba change, and how much change
will its political system tolerate? In
this regard there is no consensus on
the island. The regime itself is unsure
which way to turn, and thus seems to
be heading in contradictory directions. For instance it has rejected
market mechanisms and economic
liberalization, while encouraging
joint ventures and tourism.
Above all the Cuban government
is trying to avoid losing control at
home. It will therefore attempt to
manage the pressures for change
that are emanating from the state
and party, as well as from below and
abroad. Yet the process of social
change is hardly controllable or antiseptic, even when directed from

T
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society has already been "contaminated" by reformist ideas, rendering
ineffective the old-time revolutionary

mythology.
Whether we like it or not, the Castro government is not about to come
tumbling down. A domino theory for
the socialist world is simplistic and
inaccurate. Although some forces
are pulling the state and the society
apart, other forces are keeping them
together. On the one hand, economic
decline, falling living conditions, and
political discontent are not enough
to undermine the system. On the
other hand, repression is not the only
cement that binds the pieces.
As occurs in other countries, a
significant number of Cubans form

above. To make matters worse, Cuba's
alternatives are neither clear nor
promising.

an upper political stratum that has
actively bought into the political system, for ideological reasons, lack of
alternatives, or outright opportunism. In spite of some erosion, this
stratum's support remains strong.
Meanwhile, for the same reasons that
common citizens elsewhere identify
with their national institutions and
leaders, "rank-and-file" Cubans
remain loyal fidelistas and will rally
around their lider mdiximo to the end.
In short, state-society relations in
Cuba are like an incessantly bickering husband and wife: they may be
on the emotional road to divorce, but
they are held together by a shared
past, an uncertain future, and sheer
inertia. .

del Periodismo

ACuban Domino?
What is clear is that Cuba is neither
Poland nor Albania. To expect
Havana to imitate the pattern of the
Eastern bloc is to disregard the
uniqueness of the Cuban revolution
and Cuban culture. As Gustavo
Perez-Firmat states in The Cuban
Condition (1989), Cuba has always
been a "translational" society: the
island creates its own identity by
reinterpreting foreign models.
Just as simplistic is Castro's
attempt to stand up to Cuba's
dilemmas with staid symbols of ideological orthodoxy. The notion that
change can be contained like a chemical reaction in a test tube, avoiding
spillover, is anachronistic. Cuban
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Long Live Inflexibility!
by Fidel Castro

""

"

'-

e live in a world in
which many bizarre,
complex, and incomprehensible things are
happening. This is
why, remembering the
words of Camilo
[Cienfuegos], we must entrench
ourselves behind our principles. We
must entrench ourselves behind
our Marxist-Leninist ideas more than
ever; we must entrench ourselves
behind the ideas of socialism and
communism more than ever.
This revolution will never
renounce its glorious title. To honor
those who fell early fighting the
mercenaries of Gir6n, it will never
change its historic and glorious name
of Socialist Revolution of Cuba. If
some day we decide to change the
name, it will have to be given the title
the Communist Revolution of Cuba.
More than ever, we have firm,
solid convictions in what socialism
can achieve. We are more convinced
than ever that no society in history
can compare to socialism. Perhaps
we are moving ahead of our times, or
perhaps there is a trend to go back to
old times, but we do not want to go
back. We are going through bizarre
times. You should see the news dispatches and speeches carried by the
bourgeois press, which euphorically
state that socialism has ended, that it
was a dream, an illusion; that all men
should turn back to a shameful,
revulsive capitalism. The advocates
of capitalist reform are considered to
be progressive.

Editor's Note: Edited excerpts of a
speech by Fidel Castroat the inauguration of the Camilo Cienfuegos Special
Education School, publishedin
Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (November 6, 1989).

Hemisphere*Fall 1989

I contend that international news
agencies, which are largely monopolized by the imperialist and capitalist
media, have made subtle use of
words. To the champions of MarxistLeninism, to the champions of
socialism, to the champions of communism, to those who do not surrender, to those who are firm, to those
who do not waver in their ideas, to
those who believe in their ideas, to
those who are the most progressive
people and who are at the forefront
in the world, to those who have not
yielded to the imperialist ideology, to
those who have not yielded to the
imperialist harassment: they are
describing the people as inflexible.
Long live inflexibility! Long live
inflexibility when it comes to defending our revolutionary principles!
These people are also described
as conservative. Since when has capitalism been progressive? Since when
can exploitation of men by men be
regarded as progressive? Since when
has that filth been progressive? As
Marx said, when there is no more
exploitation of men by men, when
capitalism stops owning the means of
production, mankind will have
emerged from the prehistorical age,
that is, it would have entered the historical age. We have entered the historical age, but if others want to go
back to the prehistorical age, that is
their own business.
All the things I have mentioned
here today-it would have been
impossible to even dream of them
under capitalism. We have experienced these realities stemming from
socialism, whatever the difficulties
we are still experiencing, whatever
our problems. It was not socialism
that created underdevelopment;
socialism did not create colonialism;
socialism did not create the neocolonialism that is still affecting a

large portion of the world. Socialism
did not cause the famine of tens of
millions of human beings in the various continents.
All of the problems affecting the
world today-the arms race, the
nuclear threat, the contamination of
the environment, the poisoning of
the atmosphere, of the rivers, of the
seas-stem from the chaos, the anarchy, the exploitation, the irresponsibility of capitalism.
We have to be determined to face
any difficulty. We must be aware,
well-informed, very alert to everything that is going on in the world.
Come what may, we will continue to
move ahead; come what may, we will
continue to struggle for socialism
and communism. I do not believe we
will be left alone, and even if we were
left alone and were the last ones, we
would not be discouraged for a single second or moment.
We are not going to do things so
that the imperialists may say we are
good communists, good socialists.
We are not going to make concessions of any kind. Imperialism should
not even dream of this. We are not
going to make any kind of concession. If they want to consider us
demons, let them continue to consider us demons. We do not believe in
wolves disguised as grandmothers.
In our country, people work with
enthusiasm, confidence, and safety
without fearing anyone or anything,
or becoming discouraged. Knowing
that our people are ready to face
anything, are capable of attaining
any goal and challenging any danger,
and knowing that our people are
capable of defending socialism and
communism, and Marxism-Leninism
until the last drop of blood is shed,
we can say with the same conviction
of that year: today the Cuban people
embody one single Camilo! u

Cuba and the American Left
by LisandroPerez

"

alifax" has become one

of the code words in the
Cuban-American political
lexicon for "dialogue"
between Cubans on both
sides of the Florida Strait.
The residents of the Nova
Scotia maritime province cannot
possibly suspect that the name of
their city is now part of the political
discourse in, of all places, Miami.
The reason is the November 1989
conference on Cuba convened in
Halifax by St. Mary's University and
the Canadian Association of Latin
American Studies. In attendance
were Cubans from the US and Cuba,
as well as North Americans and
Europeans.
To be sure, the willingness of the
two groups of Cubans in Halifax to
engage in a frank exchange was an
important aspect of the conference.
Not that this exchange was the most
significant aspect of the gathering.
After all, Cubans inside and outside
the island, especially academics, have
been communicating with each other
for more than a decade. Halifax was
just another chapter in that ongoing
-and sometimes tortuousexchange.
More significant was the broader
picture. There were nearly 500 persons in attendance at the Canadian
conference, of which probably no
more than 100 were Cubans living
either inside or outside the island.
Most of the attendees were North
American and European scholars
and writers who have long sympa-

LisandroPerez is chairof the Department of Sociology and Anthropology
and head of the Committee on Cuban
Studies at FloridaInternational
University.
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thized with the Cuban revolution.
The statements and mood of many
representatives of the American Left
were the most extraordinary aspect
of the conference.
During the rousing final reception of the gathering, one of its
organizers reminded the attendees
that 1989 was not only the 30th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, but
also the 20th anniversary of Woodstock. The seemingly incongruous
remark was entirely appropriate for
the occasion.
To understand this, one has to
realize what the Cuban revolution
has meant to the left in the US and
especially to the American counterculture of the 1960s. Saul Landau,
who was at Halifax, explained it this
way in MotherJones magazine (JulyAugust 1989): "Like other foreigners
who visited Cuba in the early revolutionary years, I discovered there were
wonderful possibilities that Jean-Paul

power in a stagnant revolution. Without abandoning their socialist and
revolutionary stances, representatives of the American Left made clear
in Halifax their criticisms of the state
of affairs in Cuba. For instance, Landau distributed his MotherJones article, in which he writes that "Cubans
may not be able to break through the
current crisis, both economic and
political, with Fidel as Father, a role
that prevents his people from
achieving full political adulthood."
Other participants at Halifax,
long known for being sympathetic
analysts of the revolution, mournfully noted the dismal performance
of the economy, the disastrous consequences of the rectification campaign that a few years ago eliminated
some progressive reforms, the continuing monolithic character of the
Cuban political system, and the ethical questions raised by the Ochoa-

De la Guardia Affair. The barbarous
application of the death penalty to

persons whose crimes were presumably confined to drug trafficking and
corruption, was difficult to accept by
those who have consistently opposed
capital punishment in the US. At
Halifax the enthusiastic support of
the American Left for the youthful
reformism of the Cuban revolution
seemed-like Woodstock-a thing
of the distant past.
Quite possibly when Cuban
deputy minister Ricardo Alarc6n
returned from Halifax to Havana
and reported to Castro, he didn't
even mention the "frank exchange"
with the Cuban-Americans. He
might have been too busy describing
the mood among the revolution's old
American friends. In a world in
which Cuba is becoming increasingly
isolated, this was yet another bit of
bad news for Castro. a

Sartre and C. Wright Mills popularized for the European and American New Left ... the zany
experiment, and the contagious
enthusiasm of its leader, attracted
revolutionaries who could not abide
by the repressive doctrine and reality
of Soviet socialism."
Indeed, the countercultural
movement that displayed itself on a
New York farm 20 years ago had a
natural affinity with a revolution led
by young rebels who had instituted
sweeping social reforms in defiance
of the US "military-industrial complex." The Cuban revolution was an
important symbol and cause for the
American idealists and rebels of the
time. Now at the threshold or in the
throes of middle age, those radical
idealists of the 1960s were much in
evidence at Halifax. They traveled
long distances to talk about the revolution that is still dear to their hearts.
But how different is today's
world. For one thing, a dynamic
Soviet leader initiates far-reaching
reforms that promise to bring
democratization and openness to the
socialist world. For another, a graybearded Fidel Castro resists the
changes and becomes the aging communist reactionary, hanging on to
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iAdios! Mexican Black Gold
by JaneBussey

exico, once the
world's fourth-largest
oil producer, was
forced to cut exports
substantially in 1989
and may cease to be
an oil exporter by the
turn of the century. Faced with rising
demand and falling production,
Mexico canceled sales of its light
"Isthmus" grade oil to Israel and the
US Strategic Petroleum Reserve and
dropped to sixth place on the list of
the world's oil producers.
More ominous still, a study prepared by the Planning Department
of the state monopoly Petr61leos
Mexicanos (PEMEX) says that even
with extensive investments in exploration, crude exports will halt completely by the end of the century.
There seems to be little awareness
outside Mexico that the country has
been cutting its exports, more than

Oil has been linked to Mexico's
economic fortunes since 1977, when
the government of former president
Jose L6pez Portillo announced the
country had joined the league of oil
giants with proven reserves of 72.5
billion barrels. The conviction among
Mexican government planners that
world oil prices would continue to

Reduced Shipments
The gasoline situation and discrepancies with the US Energy Department
over payments forced PEMEX to
cancel crude contracts with Israel

and the US-approximately 85,000
barrels a day in all-so that the
higher grade Isthmus crude used for
export could be diverted to Mexico's
oil refineries for gasoline production.
PEMEX sources said Mexico's other
grade of crude, "Maya;' was too
heavy for Mexican refineries to process quickly. According to press
reports, Mexico also plans to reduce
its Isthmus exports to Japan by

half of which go to the US.
In the latest round of negotiations on Mexico's $100-billion foreign
debt, commercial bankers included a
"windfall profit-sharing" clause.
Under the clause, if oil prices rise
above $14 a barrel in real terms after
1996, Mexico will have to pay the
banks a premium. In case of a major
drop in world oil prices, Mexico will
also receive additional financing
from banks. Mexico's position in the
oil market has become a great worry,
however, for both PEMEX analysts
an
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omy. "PEMEX has always been seen
as the checking account of the
nation;' said one PEMEX source,
who asked not to be identified.
"Lately, it has been the banks' guarantee that Mexico can pay."
JaneBussey is a free-lance writer based
in Mexico City.

In 1989 Mexico has switched roles
from gasoline exporter to gasoline
importer to meet rapidly rising
domestic demand, at an estimated
cost to the balance of payments
of $600 million. From January to
August 1989 domestic demand for
gasoline rose 12.5%, spurred on by
an artificially low price maintained by
the government's anti-inflation
program.

30,000 barrels a day, although US
rise indefinitely set the country on a
$60-billion borrowing spree that
ended in 1982 because oil prices
started to fall. Since the economic
crisis began, the Mexican government has given PEMEX investments
a low priority. Expenditures on
drilling and exploration have been
slashed by 50%.
This cutback has meant lower
production. From a high of 2.7 million barrels a day in 1984, Mexico is
now producing 2.5 million barrels
daily. Official reserves, estimated at
72.5 billion barrels in 1983, are now
officially set at 67.6 billion barrels,
and some even question that figure.

clients are expected to increase
their purchases.
Mexico's weakening position in
the world oil markets is underscored
by a confidential internal PEMEX
report entitled "Possibilities of
Crude and Natural Gas Production
1989-2000." The report warns that,
under the present levels of investment, crude oil production would
fall from the current 2.5 million barrels a day to 1.5 million in the year
2000. "This decline in production
would cause an accelerated reduction in the crude export platform to
the point that very probably exports
would have to be suspended starting
in 1997" the report says. The study's
most optimistic forecast, in which the
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on 1989 crude sales totaled $4.8 billion in the first eight months of the
year, a few hundred million more
than originally projected. But estimated total annual earnings of $7.2
billion are still less than half of the
$15 billion Mexico earned from
crude exports in 1984 and do not
even cover the service on the country's foreign debt.
There have long been questions
about the spectacular increase in
reserves in the late 1970s. Recently
the Banco Nacional de Mexico placed
reserves at only 46 billion barrels,
arguing that development of the
Chicontepec field in northernVeracruz-which accounts for onefourth of the official reserves-is not
feasible at current prices. In October
1989 Fausto Alzati of the Nacional
Financieradevelopment bank, admitted
the official reserves "were established
with technical criteria that were perhaps excessively generous." While on
paper Mexico has oil reserves for 57
years, industry experts say Mexico will
run into supply problems before

investments in exploration are double the current amount, still projects
crude oil exports ending by 1999.
"Even in the case that investments
increased significantly, crude oil and
natural gas production could not be
sustained in the actual levels," the
study says.
The report also says that the discovery of new oil deposits would
have little effect on the decline in the
medium term because of the time lag
between discovery and commercial
exploitation. The study shows that
exports will fall from the 1.2 million
barrels a day planned for 1990 to
around 800,000 barrels daily within a
couple of years, drastically cutting a
vital source of foreign exchange.

Missed the Mark
Although predictions about the oil
market have missed the mark in the
past, the study underlines the growing concern in the industry over
Mexico's oil future. PEMEX reported
in October 1989 that export earnings

then. In the meantime the competing
demands of domestic consumption
and foreign exchange requirements
are likely to increase.
Any substantial increases in
investment are not planned for 1990
at least, the PEMEX source admitted. Instead the company is trying to
do more with less. After the January
1989 arrest ofJoaquin Hernandez
Galicia ("La Quina"), the boss of the
Petroleum Workers Union of the
Mexican Republic, more than 40,000
temporary workers were laid off and
a new labor contract was negotiated
by his successor, Sebastian Guzman
Cabrera.
Government planners are looking
for new ways to attract capital, including reclassifying basic petrochemicals so that private-sector investment
can participate. Despite these changes,
1990 promises to be another year of
stagnation in PEMEX. .

Editor'sNote: Adaptedfrom the Miami
Herald, November 19, 1989.
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The Cuban Economy

Culture and Ideology in the Americas
Richard M.Morse

Measurement and Analysis of
Socialist Performance
Andrew Zimbalist and Class Brundenius

Eminent and iconoclastic cultural historian Richard
Morse takes a series of sharply focused looks at the
Americas. He uses political ideology to contrast the
traditions of Anglo and Latin America while surveying
contemporary pressures for ideological change. He
inquires into the ways in which speech and poetry
evoke the common historical experience of North and
South America and examines the transatlantic "sea
changes" of European languages. And in the book's
final sections, he addresses the north-south transaction
from yet three more angles, ruminating on the
problems involved in conveying the Latin American
experience to U.S. students, considering the
impediments to U.S.-Puerto Rican understanding, and
recounting the mythic adventures of McLuhanaima,
"the world's first Brazilianist," as he travels through the
exotic land he has chosen for definitive research.

Until now, information on Cuban economic
performance has come largely from studies by
emigrant Cuban economists living in the United States.
Most of these studies are predictably negative. Andrew
Zimbalist and Claes Brundenius contend that they are
also wrong. Based in part on extensive interviews with
Cuban workers and officials, The Cuban Economy is
the first comprehensive account of Cuban economic
development to appear in the United States in the
thirty years since the Castro revolution. Zimbalist and
Brundenius conclude that although Cuban economic
performance falls short of government claims, Cuba is
still outperforming its Latin American neighbors. The
lessons learned about the role of the state in economic
development, they argue, have important implications
for other third world countries.

$34.50

$38.00
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Reports: Costa Rica

Saving Costa Rica's Environment
by Jack W. Hopkins

Latin America and the
Caribbean are being wasted
and destroyed at an alarm-

reforestation; once substantially covered by forests, the country envisions
importing wood by 1995 to meet its
needs.
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of North America, LatinAmerica and the Caribbean.
a devastating rate of deforestation. A
biological paradise containing a striking variety of plant and animal species, Costa Rica faces the prospect of
a permanent loss of many of these
species and the destruction of its
basis for agricultural and economic
growth. For the past quarter century,
some 50,000 hectares of forest have
been destroyed each year without

Jack W.Hopkins is professorof public
and environmentalaffairs at Indiana
University.

Nacional.The Tropical Agronomy
Center for Research and Teaching at
Turrialba was founded in 1942, followed in the 1960s by the founding of
the Tropical Science Center and the
Organization of Tropical Studies (a
consortium of North American universities and the Universidadde Costa
Rica). In the 1970s the establishment
of the National Parks Service and the
National Council for Scientific and
Technological Research consolidated
the organizational underpinnings for
the rapid development of Costa Rica's
conservation movement. This move-
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case is that of the Cor-

covado National Park in southwestern Costa Rica. Traditionally the
economy of the region has been dominated by production of bananas for
export. But plant diseases, declining
world market prices, labor unrest,
and other problems led to the closing
of the plantations and withdrawal
of the foreign fruit companies. Displaced workers began panning for
gold in the national park, where they
caused serious environmental
damage to rivers and streams. The
problems of Corcovado vividly
called attention to the critical links
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Reports: Mexico

investments in exploration are double the current amount, still projects
crude oil exports ending by 1999.
"Even in the case that investments
increased significantly, crude oil and
natural gas production could not be
sustained in the actual levels," the
study says.
The report also says that the discovery of new oil deposits would
have little effect on the decline in the
medium term because of the time lag
between discovery and commercial
exploitation. The study shows that
exports will fall from the 1.2 million
barrels a day planned for 1990 to
around 800,000 barrels daily within a
couple of years, drastically cutting a
vital source of foreign exchange.

on 1989 crude sales totaled $4.8 billion in the first eight months of the
year, a few hundred million more
than originally projected. But estimated total annual earnings of $7.2
billion are still less than half of the
$15 billion Mexico earned from
crude exports in 1984 and do not
even cover the service on the country's foreign debt.
There have long been questions
about the spectacular increase in
reserves in the late 1970s. Recently
the Banco Nacionalde Mixico placed
reserves at only 46 billion barrels,
arguing that development of the
Chicontepec field in northernVeracruz-which accounts for onefourth of the official reserves-is not

then. In the meantime the competing
demands of domestic consumption
and foreign exchange requirements
are likely to increase.
Any substantial increases in
investment are not planned for 1990
at least, the PEMEX source admitted. Instead the company is trying to
do more with less. After the January
1989 arrest ofJoaquin Hernandez
Galicia ("La Quina"), the boss of the
Petroleum Workers Union of the
Mexican Republic, more than 40,000
temporary workers were laid off and
a new labor contract was negotiated
by his successor, Sebastian Guzmin
Cabrera.
Government planners are looking
for new ways to attract capital, includ:n

rorlnCcrfrnmn hnrr

ntrrbrn

Missed the Mark
Although predictions about
market have missed the mal
past, the study underlines t]
ing concern in the industry
Mexico's oil future. PEMEX
in October 1989 that expor
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Cuban workers and officials, Ihe Cuban Economy is
the first comprehensive account of Cuban economic
development to appear in the United States in the
thirty years since the Castro revolution. Zimbalist and
Brundenius conclude that although Cuban economic
performance falls short of government claims, Cuba is
still outperforming its Latin American neighbors. The
lessons learned about the role of the state in economic
development, they argue, have important implications
for other third world countries.
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Reports: Costa Rica

Saving Costa Rica's Environment
by Jack W. Hopkins

he natural resources of

Latin America and the
Caribbean are being wasted
and destroyed at an alarming rate. Vast areas of forest
fall under the unregulated
logger's chain saw; clearcutting (cutting trees without
replanting) is more the rule than the
exception. Subsistence farmers cut
and burn for a year or two of good
crops and then move on to repeat the
process. Cattle ranchers heedlessly
convert steep, forested hillsides to
pasture land, and then permit overgrazing that leads to severe erosion
and often permanent damage to the
land. The stripping of the ground
cover reduces the natural absorptive
capacity of watersheds, thereby
increasing flood damage, soil loss,
and silting in rivers and reservoirs.

The Costa Rican Model
Costa Rica is a telling example of the
severity of environmental degradation occurring in the region, as well
as a hopeful model for controlling
that degradation. Since the 1960s
Costa Rica has achieved an exemplary record of establishing national
parks and reserves. Simultaneously,
however, its territory has experienced
a devastating rate of deforestation. A
biological paradise containing a striking variety of plant and animal species, Costa Rica faces the prospect of
a permanent loss of many of these
species and the destruction of its
basis for agricultural and economic
growth. For the past quarter century,
some 50,000 hectares of forest have
been destroyed each year without

Jack W Hopkins is professorofpublic
and environmentalaffairs atIndiana
University.

reforestation; once substantially covered by forests, the country envisions
importing wood by 1995 to meet its
needs.

Costa Rica is fortunate, though,
in that by the 1970s the scientific base
and culture to support a healthy conservation movement were solidly in
place. This base was a prerequisite
for the subsequent development of
the country's national parks and
reserves. Reform at the Universidad
de Costa Rica in the 1950s led to
increased emphasis on the natural
sciences and applied disciplines, as
well as the revitalization of the Museo
Nacional.The Tropical Agronomy
Center for Research and Teaching at
Turrialba was founded in 1942, followed in the 1960s by the founding of
the Tropical Science Center and the
Organization of Tropical Studies (a
consortium of North American universities and the Universidadde Costa
Rica). In the 1970s the establishment
of the National Parks Service and the
National Council for Scientific and
Technological Research consolidated
the organizational underpinnings for
the rapid development of Costa Rica's
conservation movement. This move-

ment derives support from a comparatively egalitarian social structure
and a political system that has functioned with remarkable stability since
the civil war of 1948 restored democratic government.
The impressive result, rivaled by
few countries in the world, is a
national park and reserve system that
includes more than 25% of Costa
Rica's territory. Yet this accomplishment conceals the rapid deforestation and degradation of much of the
country's remaining area, even
within the national parks. Along with
the efforts of nongovernmental organizations such as the National Parks
Foundation and the Neotropic Foundation, the conservation community
has fought an uphill battle both to
protect the progress achieved and to
replace the devastation of the natural
environment with sustainable
development.
Several circumstances have
driven home the importance of sustainable development--which
emphasizes the compatibility of a
healthy economy with the collective
responsibility for preserving the environment-and encouraged the conservation community to search for
solutions. The most prominent and
compelling case is that of the Corcovado National Park in southwestern Costa Rica. Traditionally the
economy of the region has been dominated by production of bananas for
export. But plant diseases, declining
world market prices, labor unrest,
and other problems led to the closing
of the plantations and withdrawal
of the foreign fruit companies. Displaced workers began panning for
gold in the national park, where they
caused serious environmental
damage to rivers and streams. The
problems of Corcovado vividly
called attention to the critical links

Hemisphere. Fall 1989

Reports: Costa Rica

between, on the one hand, conservation and national parks, and on the
other hand, the surrounding society
and economy. It became clear that
parks and reserves cannot be protected unless the population around
them is secure.
Depressed economic conditions
and lack of employment alternatives
force people into survival activities;
under such conditions, attempting
simply to "protect" a park is futile.
Despite costly programs to evict the
illegal miners and relocate them, the
Costa Rican government failed to
solve the problem in traditional ways.
The costs exceeded the total budget
of the National Park Service.
As much as any other factor, the
situation in the Corcovado National
Park gave impetus to the concept of
sustainable development in Costa
Rica. In turn this concept provoked
the sweeping reorganization of the
government structure for conservation. The changes being implemented fundamentally alter the
philosophy of conservation as well as
the management style and the organization of Costa Rica's national park
system. These changes, although
unique to Costa Rica, may have relevance to other countries struggling
to deal with environmental problems. In country after country, finding a workable balance between
conservation and development poses
enormous difficulties.
The World Conservation Strategy
of 1980 was formulated by the International Union for the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources in
cooperation with the UN Environmental Program and the World Wildlife Fund. This strategy focuses on
three objectives: maintenance of
ecological processes and life support
systems, preservation of genetic
diversity, and sustainable use of species and ecosystems. The Costa
Rican version of this strategy-the
EstrategiaConservadoraparael Desarrollo Sostenible (ECODES)-broadens
the concept of sustainable development, stressing issues such as the
linkages between a healthy economy,
social justice, and an environmentalist ethic. ECODES is based on a clear
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diagnosis of Costa Rica's environmental problems, on the government's strong commitment to
sustainable development, and on an
unusually high level of international
support.

National Park Service) and noncivil
service staff (of the Neotropic Foundation) work alongside each other
with respective jurisdictions established by law.
Not all URCs will follow this
mixed-management concept; a key
feature of the plan is flexibility in
organizational arrangements, with
URC directors having the main
responsibility for their regions. This
feature stands in marked contrast to
both the old system and the topheavy organization of the National
Park Service. Indeed, the scheme will
eventually incorporate people from
the municipalities into the planning
process as part of the regional
committees, which will advise URC
directors. Many of the precise
administrative arrangements, such as
the selection of local representatives,
are as yet unspecified. It is likely that
URCs will develop significant
authority.

Regional Prospects?

Costa Rica became the first
country in Central America and the
Caribbean to elevate environmental
concerns to a cabinet-level position.
In 1988 the previously scattered
organizations that dealt with natural
resources, energy, mining, and
national parks and reserves were
consolidated into the Ministry of
Natural Resources, Energy and
Mines. In 1989 the ministry implemented a reorganized structure for
the new environmental strategy,
which amounts to a sweeping change
in the previously fragmented system
of management. The plan is remarkable in organization, philosophy,
and policy.
Organizationally the plan creates
nine new Regional Conservation and
Sustainable Development Units
(URCs). This scheme is modeled after
the structure for the new Guanacaste
National Park, which involves a
regional advisory committee that
includes local representatives. In
addition, government staff (ofthe

The Costa Rican plan-an overhaul
of the structure and philosophy of
the nation's conservation system
-evolved from months of discussion
and preparation by the conservation
community, inside and outside of
government. It afforded, moreover,
an opportunity for extensive public
discussion and debate about matters
such as the environmental roles of
the private sector and the
government.
Will other Latin American countries soon follow Costa Rica's environmentalist path? Other Latin
American countries, facing similar
ecological problems, may not enjoy
the combination of advantages that
Costa Rica possesses: a relatively stable, demilitarized political system;
broad consensus on environmental
goals; and substantial international
commitment and financial support.
Hence they may lack the means to
implement such an ambitious program. Nevertheless, Costa Rica's
program may serve other countries
well as a model for undertaking the
critical task of saving the earth's
environment. .

Reports: Honduras

Mozart in Honduran Barrios
by Andres Oppenheimer

'"lum children in a corner of
Honduras have found a
new way of escaping poverty and hopelessness:
studying Mozart, Bach, and
Beethoven, and becoming
classical music virtuosos.
In what organizers proudly describe
as the best-kept musical secret in the
hemisphere, the 75-student Victoriano L6pez music high school is
giving Honduran youths-many of
them from impoverished homesa chance to become world-class
concert performers.
One recent graduate was
accepted by New York's Julliard
School of Music. Another won second place in a nationwide American
String Teachers' Association contest.
Ten other recent graduates have won
full scholarships to pursue their
musical studies at Columbus College
in Georgia. "Many students have
made wonderful careers abroad,"
said Gloria de Gallegos, mother of a
graduate of the school. "Our daughter wants to become a classical violinist. We're hoping she will get a
scholarship and study abroad."
The school operates in an
unlikely atmosphere. It is located in
the El Prado neighborhood of San
Pedro Sula, an industrial city in the
heart of the Honduran bananagrowing region, on a street that was
paved only five years ago. On any
afternoon, the music of Mozart,
Schubert, or Vivaldi clashes with the
gnashing metal sounds from nearby
factories. A Pepsi-Cola bottling plant
is a block away. Several other factories and warehouses are scattered
throughout the neighborhood. At
Andres Oppenheimeris a Latin
America correspondentfor the
Miami Herald.
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the school's entrance-in place of the
portraits of independence heroes
that hang in most Latin American
schools-are pictures of Schubert,
Haydn, Liszt, and other composers.
The only Honduran whose portrait
hangs on the wall is Victoriano
L6pez, the small-town music teacher
who founded San Pedro Sula's first
music school in the mid-1940s. Inside
is a library with 3,000 music scores,
carefully folded in cardboard
boxes discarded by a nearby factory.
According to officials, the school
-which is partially funded by the
Honduran Education Ministry, the
city of San Pedro Sula, the Central
Bank, and private donations-has to
find creative ways of functioning
within its meager budget.

Rigorous Discipline
Tuition is free, but students must
show musical talent to be admitted,
and must be ready to comply with
the school's rigorous discipline to
stay in. Students go to their regular
high schools in the morning. In the

VOICES
FROM
LATIN
AMERICA

afternoon they attend the Victoriano
L6pez school, where they can obtain
a second high school diploma after
five years of study. There is a fivehour daily schedule of violin, piano,
or flute lessons, plus homework.
There are 26 small rooms where students receive daily individual lessons
from one of the eight full-time faculty members. The curriculum
includes three years of music reading, five years of a major instrument
such as violin, three years of a minor
instrument, and five years of group
performance, including orchestra,
choir, and small ensemble. "Some
parents criticize us because they
think our music is too serious,"' said
directorJose Antonio Chain, an
Uruguayan-born violinist, "but they
generally end up liking it." To help
fund itself, the school offers about
60 concerts a year, most in the
school's 130-seat auditorium. The
seats came from a demolished theater in New Orleans. One donor
paid their transport to Miami, and
another paid their way on to
Honduras.

& McKennie Goodpasture
CROSS AND SWORD
An Eyewitness History of Christianityin Latin America
Ra61 G6mez Treto
THE CHURCH AND SOCIALISM IN CUBA
Jack Nelson-Palimeyer
WAR AGAINST THE POOR
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Guilio Girardi
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ROMERO
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Andrew Reding
CHRISTIANITY AND REVOLUTION
Tomds Borge's Theology of Life

Several of the school's graduates
who are on full scholarships in US
schools come from homes where
food is scarce. The school's parents'
association pays for the meals of students who cannot afford lunch.
"In one recent case, a construction
worker whose son studied at the
school wanted to take the kid out and
put him to work," Chain said. "We
persuaded him not to. Now the boy is
in a US college, all expenses paid,"
he continued. "His parents can't
believe it. They think it's a miracle."
According to Chain, one of the
reasons Victoriano L6pez students
do so well in the US is that they are
"performance-driven." He observed
that the school puts much more
emphasis on performance than most
of its US counterparts. "Our school
is competition-oriented," Chain said.
"All our competitions are behind
curtains. Our children are used to
competition from early on. They
don't freak out when facing an
important test."

Few Distractions
Robin Smith, an American music
instructor who is part of the school's
staff, says that in some ways San
Pedro Sula offers a better atmosphere for classical music training
than many US or European cities.
"We have a great advantage here:
there are very few distractions
around," she said. "There is nothing
else to do in San Pedro Sula. These
children live playing music." On the
minus side, Honduran students usually start out playing by rote and
showing little creativity, Smith said.
Once instructors encourage them to
overcome their inhibitions, however,
they become excellent musicians,
she said.
Wouldn't most of the students
prefer to play rock music if given a
choice? "Not at all," countered
Smith. "That's the other big advantage we have: there's no teen-age
rebelliousness here, and rebelliousness is what produces rock music.' a
Editor'sNote: Adaptedfrom the Miami
Herald, August 17,1989.
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New Books on Latin America and the Caribbean
Nicaragua Divided
La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy

PatriciaTaylor Edmisten
"Edmisten puts current Nicaraguan politics into perspective and gives the reader a sense of the complexities of
the present situation."
-Charles Ameringer, Pennsylvania State University
UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA PRESS
March 0972-3 Cloth $19.95

Dictionary of Latin American
Racial and Ethnic Terminology
Thomas M. Stephens
"For the first time a comprehensive collection of racial,
ethnic, and regional designations has been brought
together in one place.... It should dispel myths about
the lack of overt and covert discrimination in Latin
American ... a valuable dialectological tool."
-John M. Lipski, University of Florida
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
March 0965-0 Cloth $45.00

The Journal of Don Francisco
Saavedra de Sangronis, 1780-1783
ed. FranciscoMorales Padrdn
trans.Aileen Moore Topping
"The turbulent and immensely fascinating Spanish
colonial world of the Caribbean at the close of the
American Revolution is stunningly revealed in this
excellently translated journal."
-Robert V. Remini, University of Illinois at Chicago
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0877-8 Cloth $28.00

Zespedes in East Florida, 1784-1790
Helen Hornbeck Tanner
"A very successful case-study of the East Florida
governorship in the first six years of Spain's return to the
peninsular province."-Americas
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA PRESS
0958-8 Paper $14.95

Jose Lezama Lima,
Poet of the Image
Emilio F. Bejel
"A stimulating and rigorous analysis of one of Spanish
America's most difficult and complex writers ... a
significant addition to Lezama studies."-Justo C. Ulloa,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
April 0980-4 Cloth $19.95

Between God and the Party
Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Cuba
John M. Kirk
"A comprehensive and balanced survey of relations
between church and state in Castro's Cuba. .. . Kirk's
careful analysis of the role of religion in the processes of
social change in Latin America ... also illuminates an
aspect of the Cuban revolution often ignored."-Choice
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA PRESS
0909-X Paper $15.00

First Encounters
Spanish Explorations in the Caribbean
and the United States, 1492-1570

ed. JeraldT. Milanich & Susan Milbrath
"An excellent paradigm of what historical archaeology
and history have to offer in illuminating our past."
-Bruce D. Smith, Smithsonian Institution
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0946-4 Cloth $44.95; 0947-2 Paper $16.95

University Presses of Florida
15 NW 15th Street, Gainesville, Florida 32611, 904-392-1351
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

The Down Side of
Eastern Europe's Opening
A November 1989 French Agency
Press wire points to a major dilemma
for Western Europe: where to invest?
The pressing economic needs and
favorable investment environment of
Eastern Europe may divert scarce
foreign investment that was previously destined for Latin America. To
the reported consternation of Latin
American representatives in Rome,
Italian officials declared their two
investment priorities are now North
Africa and Eastern Europe. In 1987
Italy signed a $6 billion, five-year
investment agreement with Argentina and Brazil. Venezuela has been
anxious to sign a similar accord.

Not a Best Seller
In his "Stone Cowboy on the High
Plains" (AtlanticMonthly, June 1989),
a fictional story set in Bolivia, Mark
Jacobs calls Bolivians "trolls." The
unflattering account caught US
State Department officials off guard
because the author was one of their
own: now an embassy spokesperson
in Honduras, Jacobs wrote the article
as he was leaving a similar post in
Bolivia.

Take a "Morning Ride"
Try the new album Morning Ride
(Polygram) by Puerto Rican jazz flutist Nestor Torres. Three songs on the
album reflect the musician's Latin
roots: "Tropicalia,' "I Just Wanna
Make U Dance," and "El c6ndor
pasa." The album is his first.
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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More Mambo

Penny Lernoux

Oscar Hijuelo's The Mambo Kings
Play Songs of Love (Farrar, Straus,
Giroux, 1989) details New York's
Latin popular-music currents of the
1950s. One review described the
Cuban-American novelist's second
book as "original in conception,
stylish in execution and exuberant
in its largeness of spirit."

On October 8, 1989, cancer claimed
49-year-old Penny Lernoux, author
of numerous books and articles on
Latin America, including the popularly acclaimed Cry of the People (Dou-

No "More Mambo"
Dmnaso Perez Prado died on September 14, 1989, in Mexico City at
the age of 72. Originally a classical
pianist, Perez moved from his native
Cuba to Mexico in 1948 to expand
upon his musical repertoire. There
he became famous for his "Que rico
el mambo," later released in the US
as "More Mambo." Credited with
fomenting the "mambo craze" of the
mid-1950s, Perez's "Cherry Pink and
Appleblossom White" led the music
charts for a time in 1955.

So What Else IsNew?
Business Week's October 23, 1989,
article on "cocaine countries" reveals
once again the immense difficulties confronting countries that
attempt to cooperate with US drugeradication efforts. For instance,
Bolivia-once an economic basket
case, but now a "showcase," according to some State Department insiders-has had some success in crop
substitution. But according to the
magazine, the US "Congress has kept
a tight rein on any money for Andean
soybean assistance.' Who's responsible? The US soybean lobby.

bleday, 1980). A resident of Bogota
for more than two decades and a
chain-smoker, Lernoux left a husband and young daughter.

Banding Together
Konbit (A&M Records, 1989), a compilation of Haitian dance music, is
the latest venture of filmmaker
Jonathan Demme (Something Wild,
Married to the Mob). Demme gained
his musical credentials with 1985's
Stop Making Sense, a concert film of
the American pop group Talking
Heads; recent forays into pop music
geography by Talking Head David
Byrne may have inspired Demme to
create his own compilation. The proceeds from Konbit-or "community
work brigade"-will benefit "Water
for People," a self-help development
project in Haiti. Among the performers are Haitian groups Tabou
Combo, Magnum Band, and D. P
Express, as well as the Neville
Brothers of New Orleans.

Global Standards?
"Think globally, act locally" is no
longer a mere cliche, as some people
are thinking daring thoughts. In the
Netherlands there is incipient, highlevel discussion about replacing
Dutch with English as the official
language. In Argentina influential
voices are advocating adoption of the
US dollar as the national currency.

E

Grin and Bear It

What's ina Nacatamal?

People on the Move

When he was in Honduras as head
of the US Information Agency in
1980-85, Cresencio Arcos moved
around the country with the authority and respect of an ambassador.
Now, after four years in Washington,
Arcos has been nominated by the
Bush administration to be the new
US envoy to Honduras. How have
the Hondurans responded? One
newspaper editorial pointed to the
ambassador-designate's qualifications
by stating: "During his earlier stay
he constructed a vast network of relations with politicians, businessmen,
labor leaders, professionals, and military officers...and he came to
understand the visible and hidden
mechanisms" of the regional crisis.
Another analysis of the Arcos nomination referred to his "detailed
knowledge of the country" and
called him a "sagacious calculator."

The Nicaraguan influx in Miami has
helped to diversify the local diet.
Now, Little Havana sports numerous
fritangas,or sidewalk barbecues, that
feature the nacatamal,a Nicaraguan
dish. What's in a nacatamal? Rice,
prunes, green olives, pork, and
potatoes are smothered in corn meal
and surrounded by a banana leaf.
The nacatamal is then boiled for two
hours and served steaming and yellow, to be eaten out of the leaf.

Tim Golden has written his last article for the Miami Herald.He is now
with the New York Times and will
resume his Latin American newscoverage efforts following a newemployees orientation in the Big

ANew "Art Form"
Now that he is retired from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William
Crowe Jr. has gone public with his
long-standing antagonism toward
former assistant secretary of state
Elliott Abrams. In response to an
Abrams opinion-page editorial (The
New York Times, October 5, 1989) on
the need to use "power" against Panama's General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Crowe stated the proposals
were "naive in their formulation and
reckless in their casual commitment
of our military men and women":'
According to Crowe, "Mr. Abrams
raises [this approach] to an art form"
(The New York Times, October 16,

1989).

Apple.
Ronald William Roskens has been
named by President George Bush as
the new head of USAID. He became
available for the job after he was
fired as president of the University
of Nebraska.

Energizing Brazil
In the 1970s sugar-based alcohol fuel
seemed the perfect solution to two
of Brazil's critical problems: hardcurrency imports of oil and environmental pollution. One third of Brazil's
12.5 million cars run solely on this
fuel. Yet many car owners might soon
be walking to work: there is a shortfall of some 2 billion liters. Imported
gasoline is now cheaper than sugarbased alcohol.

Guido di Tella has been appointed
the Argentine ambassador to the US.
The new ambassador holds a Ph.D. in
economics from MIT. He served as a
Judicialist Party congressional representative in 1988-89 and co-edited
The PoliticalEconomy of Argentina,

1946-1983 (MacMillan, 1989).
Carla Anne Robbins has taken leave
from US News and World Report to
enjoy a Nieman Foundation Fellowship at Harvard University.

They're Everywhere
Add Mario Vargas Llosa to the growing list of presidential candidates
who are relying on US public relations firms to guide their electoral
campaigns. The Sawyer-Miller Group
of New York is assisting Vargas Llosa
to develop his campaign strategy; the
firm has probed issue receptivity
within the electorate through public
polling and focus groups. SawyerMiller has handled the successful
campaigns of Coraz6n Aquino (Philippines), Rodrigo Borja (Ecuador),
and Virgilio Barco (Colombia),
among others.

David Bray is the Inter-American
Foundation's new program representative for Mexico. Formerly the program representative for Paraguay,
Bray will be residing in Oaxaca from

January to July 1990.

Ricardo Arias Calder6n, the new
first vice president of Panama, was
successively chair of the philosophy
department, dean of Arts and Sciences, and academic vice president
at Florida International University.
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Crisis and Cinema in Latin America
by Ana M. L6pez

nationalist dreams, an
arena for revolutionary
arguments, a victim of censorship, and the prey of
international
economic
ong a source of
pride and
forces, the Latin American cinema continues to thrive,
undaunted by what may be the most
serious threat it has ever faced.
Unlike the economic threat faced
in the 1930s, when Hollywood forever changed the cinema with sound
technology that Latin American
nations could ill afford, or the political threats of the 1970s, when a series
of military coups d'etat stifled the
hopes of many revolutionary filmmakers, the current danger is simultaneously social, economic, and
political: the Latin American cinema
is losing its theatrical audiences. The
cinema's long reign as the region's
most energetic sociocultural force
may have ended.
This phenomenon is not unique
to Latin America. Throughout Western Europe and North America, the
theatrical film gradually lost ground
to television, cable, and home video
over the last two decades. In Latin
America, however, the process has
been more rapid and, paradoxically,

L
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has forced the cinema to reach new
levels of achievement. On the eve of
the new century the cinema stands
poised to surge forward with new
creative energies, sophisticated technology, and innovative organization.

From Past to Present
The 1960s were years of political and
cultural effervescence in Latin America, and the cinema-conceived of as
an aesthetic, cultural, and political
medium-was fully immersed in the
debates of the era. In the 1960s it
became clear that a "national" cinema could be a powerful mass
medium, especially when produced
and circulated outside established
industrial channels. Beginning in the
1930s, quasi-industrial organizations
in countries like Mexico, Argentina,
and Brazil had attempted to produce
national cinemas following the Hollywood model of production. But by
the 1950s their near financial and
aesthetic bankruptcy, and the sudden
international visibility of antiHollywood movements such as Italian
Neo-Realism and the French New
Wave, invigorated Latin America's
search for viable national cinemas
with alternative social aspirations.
In Buenos Aires, for example, a
group of young amateur filmmakers,
trained in cine-clubs and universities
rather than in the established industry, approached the cinema as a vehicle for self-expression. Known as

the Nueva Ola, this group was much
influenced by the French New Wave
and made narratively experimental,
personal films that focused on what
they knew best, the middle class of
Buenos Aires. In the interior city of
Santa Fe, Fernando Birri, a filmmaker trained at the Centro Sperimentale in Rome (the birthplace of the
Neo-Realist movement), called for
another kind of national cinema. He
proposed an Argentine cinema that
focused on the physiognomy of the
people and the land: a cinema of the
humble rather than the exalted. His
work at the Documentary School of
Santa Fe, where he produced films
such as Tire di6 (1956-60) and Los
Inundados (1961) and a number of
important theoretical texts, served as
a paradigm for many Latin American
filmmakers.
In Brazil the CinemaNovo movement of the 1960s also rose out of the
ashes of a bankrupt attempt to produce a cinema of Hollywood-studio
quality (at the Vera Cruz studios in
Sao Paulo). These filmmakers took
on the cinema as a medium for the
radicalization of culture. Politically,
stylistically, and practically, they
bypassed industrial limits and developed the language of cinema in films
such as Nelson Pereira dos Santos's
Vidas Secas (1963), Glauber Rocha's
Barravento(1962), Carlos Diegues's

Ganga Zuma (1963), and Ruy
Guerra's Os Cafajestes (1963).
Similarly inspired filmmakers in

S

Cuba had a marked advantage over
their Latin American counterparts.
In 1960, only three months after the
triumph of the revolution, the government established the Instituto
Cubanode Artes e Industrias
Cinematogrdficas(ICAIC) and
empowered it to take charge of all
cinema-related activities. The young
filmmakers who formed the core of
ICAIC began their task of developing
a national cinema from scratch by
focusing on testimonial documentaries and newsreels that chronicled
the changes taking place in Cuban
social and political life. Although this
work-particularly Santiago
Alvarez's innovative and hard-hitting
newsreels-was very effective, ICAIC

also ventured into fiction filmmaking, and by the late 1960s films such
as Tomas Gutierrez Alea's Memorias
del subdesarrollo(1968), Julio Garcia
Espinosa's Las aventurasde Juan
Quin (1967), and Humberto Solas's
Lucia (1968) proved that a different,
socially responsive national cinema
could be produced in Cuba. ICAIC's
innovative distribution and exhibition experiments-including "cine
m6viles" that brought the cinema to
remote parts of the island-further
promoted the cinema as a social
force for the consolidation of a new
socialist society.
The Argentine, Brazilian, and
Cuban movements emerged as
national attempts to change the
social function of the cinema. By the
mid-1960s, however, these national
movements found a new source of
inspiration, as well as practical and
ideological support, in the cinematic
work of their Latin American neighbors. Through a series of festivals
and meetings, organized first in Sestri Levante, Italy, and later in Vifia

del Mar, Chile (1967, 1969) and
M6rida, Venezuela (1968), film-

makers throughout Latin America
began to recognize their common
problems and goals and to formulate
the project of a New Latin American
Cinema.
The New Latin American Cinema
was, above all, conceived of as a politically engaged practice, committed to
changing the social function of the
cinema in the region. In the many
declarations and manifestos penned

in the late 1960s and 1970s, filmmakers and producers conceived of
the cinema as a vehicle, not of mass
entertainment or "auteurist" personal expression, but of social and
political consciousness. Their films
-- documentary and fictional, short
and feature length-rejected the aesthetic paradigms of the dominant
Hollywood cinema and attempted to
establish a more direct and active
communication with audiences.
Shunning mainstream channels of
distribution and exhibition, they circulated their films through alternative, often clandestine, circuits
including cine-clubs, neighborhood
associations, labor unions, and political groups.
Paradoxically, however, the New
Latin American Cinema coalesced
precisely as the region underwent
cataclysmic political changes. The
repressive regimes, military coups
d'etat, and failed socialist experiments of the 1970s exiled and/or
silenced the New Latin American
Cinema. Although exile often intensified the Pan-Latin American character of the movement (as was the
case, for example, with the prolific
Chilean exile cinema produced in
countries as diverse as Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, and Nicaragua), repression
and censorship also weakened the
movement's links with social problems and critical realities.
In addition an intrinsic contra-

diction of the New Latin American
Cinema project became apparent in
the 1970s. Although anti-establishment goals and political aspirations
seemed antithetical to the commercialization of cinematic production,
the movement sought to maximize
its popular appeal and to attract
larger audiences. Such objectives
demanded discussion in the context
of mainstream national film production, state protectionist measures,
and the cinema's commercial potential. Coupled with the political problems of the era, those concerns
reoriented the New Latin American
Cinema. Thus, in nations with
developed or developing cinematic
infrastructures, the movement was
absorbed into modified, stateprotected commercial practices. In
Brazil, for example, the state apparatus for cinema, Embrafilme,
acquired hegemonic control over
the nation's film production in the
1970s. In the different context of
Cuba, the longevity of ICAIC and its
control of national production transformed the Cuban cinema into an
official, rather than a marginal, cinema with distinctive national
imperatives.
Nonetheless, Cuba and ICAIC
have played a crucial role in the
development and continued viability
of the aspirations of the New Latin
American Cinema. ICAIC has provided production facilities for filmmakers who, because of political or
financial difficulties, are unable to
film in their own countries: Bolivia's
Jorge Sanjines, Peru's Nora Izcue,
and Chile's Patricio Guzman, Pedro
Chaskel, and Miguel Littin. ICAIC
also started the new common practice of multinational co-productions
that combines the resources and creative personnel of different countries
and improves access to Latin Ameri-
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can markets. Primarily as a sign of
solidarity with other emerging cinematographies, Cuba has dedicated
a significant portion of its scant
resources to co-productions. These
have been as diverse as Jorge Ali
Triana's Tiempo de morir (1985, with
Colombia), an adaptation of a
Gabriel Garcia Marquez story
directed in the style of a classic western; Lisandro Duque's Visa USA
(1985, also with Colombia), an amusing story of a Colombian who wants
to emigrate; and Miguel Littin's
Alsino y el c6ndor (1982, with Mexico
and Nicaragua), a fantasy about a
crippled young boy who dreams of
flying in war-torn Nicaragua.
Of greater significance, however,
is Cuba's eleven year-old annual
December festival. Bringing together
filmmakers, producers, distributors,
journalists, critics, and scholars for
ten days of screenings, meetings,
debates, and awards, the Havana festival has kept the constantly shifting
Latin American film scene in focus
for all. Together with its affiliated
market for films, videos, and television, the festival has stimulated PanLatin American efforts to promote
politically conscious national cinemas
without ignoring the medium's commercial aspects. Furthermore, as a
result of festival-sponsored seminars,
the Committee of Latin American
Filmmakers established the multinational Fundaci6ndel Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano(headed by Nobel laureate
Gabriel Garcia Marquez) and organized a tri-continental film and television school directed by Fernando
Birri. Located outside Havana, the
Escuela Internacionalde Film y Televisi6n (more commonly known as the
"Escuelade los Tres Mundos") offers a
tuition-free, three-year program in
film and video production to more
than 200 students from Africa, Asia,
and the Americas.

The Havana Festival, 1988
The festival of December 1988
proved that, although the cinema
may be suffering from reduced audiences throughout Latin America,
filmmakers are working hard to
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reverse the tide, taking advantage of
the very technologies-television and
video-that threaten the cinema's
popularity.
The 1,400 foreign delegates participating in the festival had the
opportunity to watch 55 features, 49
short fictions, 81 documentaries, 17
cartoons, 160 video programs, and
272 videos from 23 countries. There
were also a number of special mostras
as well as various seminars and
round-table discussions. From an
industrial perspective, the most
impressive event of the festival was
the premiere of two series of multinational co-productions involving television and film producers.
The first was "Amores Dificiles,"
six films adapted from Garcia Marquez's stories and directed by filmmakers from Brazil, Cuba, Colombia,
Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain. The
package was co-produced by the
International Television Group and
Televisi6n Espaiiola(RTVE) under
the auspices of the Fundaciondel
Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano.Individually conceived, the films reflect the
stylistic and political diversity of the
filmmakers. The particularly impressive films by Brazil's Ruy Guerra (La
cr6nica de la bella palomera), Cuba's
Tomais Guti6rrez Alea (Cartasdel
parque), and Colombia's Lisandro
Duque (Milagroen Roma) are convincing proof that television and the
cinema need not remain enemies in

the 1990s.
The second series was "Visi6n
Latina," a package of nine made-forTV fictional films organized at last
year's festival. Exploring a common
theme-the problems of childhood in
Latin America-" Visi6n Latina" is
not as accomplished as the more
expensive "Amores Dificiles," but it
demonstrates the vitality and importance of Pan-Latin American film
and television productions.
The festival featured a number of
other multinational productions, several of which involved the participation of ICAIC and RTVE. Because
Spain will commercialize and more

than triple its TV channels in 1990,
Spanish television producers have
looked to Latin American filmmakers

to obtain more products. Besides
"Amores Dificiles," RTVE co-produced Fernando Birri's Un sefior muy
viejo con alas enormes (with ICAIC
and Laboratoriosde PoiticaCinematogrdfica, Rome), Ramiro Lacayo's
El espectro de la guerra (with the Instituto Nicaragiensede Cinemaand the
InstitutoMexicano de Television), and
Francisco J. Lombardi's La boca del
lobo (with Tornasol Films, Spain, and
Inca Films, Peru). These films,
although markedly different, are the
result of a new industrial incentive
for the New Latin American Cinema
that promises to broaden its audience
and bolster its productivity without
compromising its integrity.
Though beset by financial difficulties and declining audiences, the
traditionally strong national cinemas
of Latin America-those of Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba-were also
well represented. The Gran Coral
award and the Coral award for best
fiction film went to an Argentine
film, Fernando Solana's Sur. A
sophisticated tanguedia(tango tragedy) of exile, loss, and return in the
style of his earlier Tangos: el exilio de
Gardel, Sur is a love story about a
man's return home from prison at
the end of Argentina's military dictatorship. The film's ample budget
(supplied by a French producer),
sophisticated technology, skilled
actors (Susi Pecoraro, Philippe Leotard, and Miguel Angel Sola in the
lead roles), original scores by Actor
Piazzola, and breathtaking cinematography by Felix Monti raise the
film to a level that easily surpasses
current Latin American standards.
A much more modest Argentine
entry, Jorge Zanada's Tango: baile
nuestro, was also impressive. An
experimental documentary about the
continued popularity of the tango
and its mythical reverberations and
implicit sexism, the film combines
interviews and clips of professional
and amateur dancers with clearly
fictionalized scenes, a probing voice
over narration, and an astounding
visual sensibility. Other festival
entries, although less accomplished
than these two films, attested to the
continued productivity of the Argen-

tine cinema. In spite of a deep economic crisis and a 55% decline in film
audiences since 1984, the Instituto
Nacional de Cinematografiahas struggled to sustain a steady rate of production, to back young filmmakers,
and to promote audience interest
through special promotions and
reduced ticket prices.
The Brazilian cinema has not
fared as well. The rapidly deteriorating Brazilian economy has diminished theatrical film audiences as well
as Embrafilme's ability to fund productions. After years of producing
an average 60 films per year, in 1988
production plunged to ten films,
only eight of which received Embrafilme funding. Most interesting
among the Brazilian offerings shown
in Havana were Roberto Gerwitz's
Feliz Ano Velho, a narratively complex
tale of postmodernist angst, and
Guilherme A. Prado's A Dama do
Cine Shangai, a highly stylized homage to the Hollywoodfilm noirstarring the popular actress Maite

Proenga. The most awarded Brazilian film was Bruno Barreto's O
Romance de Empregada, a light
romantic comedy that received a
Special Jury's Prize as well as a best
actress Coral award for lead actress
Betty Faria. These films are typical of
the contemporary Brazilian film
scene, which embodies a split
between "art"cinema with great displays of style for style's sake and a less
ambitious commercial practice with
greater popular appeal.
The Cuban cinema, although for
years insulated from market pressures by the longevity and stability of
the Cuban government and ICAIC,
has likewise confronted serious problems in the 1980s. Not the least of
these problems was the marked
decrease in theatrical film attendance that accompanied the growth
and improvement of Cuban television and the popularization of video.
Another was the bureaucratization,
stagnation, and hermeticism that
ICAIC had unwittingly fallen into.

For example, by the 1980s its once
innovative apprenticeship program
became a stumbling block for the
promotion of young filmmakers,
whose work ranged from documentaries to feature films. In 1987
ICAIC responded with a broad
reform that decentralized film production. Three independent production units were created, each headed
by a "senior" filmmaker with a clearly
identifiable style: the dialectical
Tomas Gutierrez Alea, the stylized
and operatic Humberto Solas, and
the more popular/commercial
Manuel Perez.
It is too soon to assess the effects
of these changes, but a renewed
vigor was in evidence among Cuban
filmmakers and in Plaff, the most
celebrated Cuban film premiered at
the festival. Directed by Juan Carlos
Tabio, one of the new breed of young
directors at ICAIC, Plaff is a selfreflective comedy that pokes fun at
Cuba's bureaucracies, inefficiencies,
and idiosyncratic national character.
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The film features an excellent performance by Daisy Granados as a
middle-aged widow who is uncertain
about starting a new love relationship
at her age, believes in santeria,and
fears the mysterious egg projectiles
that land all around her at every
move, making the sound "plaff" as
they fall. The winner of the Coral
award for best script, Plaffexemplifies the recent renewal of Cuban
cinematic comedy, which has taken
up the challenge of contemporaneity
and uses a specifically Cuban style of
humor as the basis for social analysis
and critique.
As always, ICAIC's documentary
work was excellent and well received,
especially Rigoberto L6pez's El viaje
mts largo, Mayra Vilasis's Con la luz
propiaand Guillermo Centeno's Volvamos a empezar, all winners of Coral
awards.
The festival also featured interesting work from unexpected countries.
Uruguay, for instance, although previously unable to sustain much film
production, has experienced a boom
in experimental and political video.
In Chile video and documentary
filmmaking have again surged,
spurred by the "Vote No" campaign
of the 1988 plebiscite and by the
loosening of Pinochet's repressive
regime. Indeed, a Chilean film, 100
nifios esperandoun tren by Ignacio
Aguero, won the Coral award for
best documentary. Likewise significant was the winner of the best opera
primaaward, Agliberto Melendez's
Pasajede ida, the first feature-length
film produced in the Dominican
Republic.
Surprisingly two of the festival's
most prominent films were from
Peru: Francisco Lombardi's La boca
del lobo and the Grupo Chaski's
Juliana.These two films, from a
nation with typically low annual film
production, manifest not only the
diversity of the festival, but also the
difference between international
scale co-productions and the smallscale collective filmmaking that once
characterized the New Latin American Cinema.
La boca del lobo is an excellently
photographed but otherwise typical
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war-action film, characterized by
many critics as a combination of Platoon and The Deerhunterwith a dose
of Apocalypse Now thrown in for
good measure. The film deals with
the problems of a young army conscript who learns-after much gory
violence and encounters with murderous Sendero Luminoso forces, a
deranged commanding officer who
likes to play Russian roulette, and a

corrupt soldier-buddy turned rapist
-that although the military institution might be rotten, there are still
some principled men with it. He also
learns that, no matter how bad it may
seem, the military institution is superior to the downtrodden peasants it
should be protecting and the Sendero
Luminoso villains it must fight. This
simplistic and politically dubious
story is impressively filmed and
skillfully narrated to please popular
audiences. Yet the film leaves a sour
aftertaste, not only because of its
politics but because it uses the same
passive and exploitative techniques
as mainstream Hollywood to mobilize its audiences. The only unique
feature of the resolutely two-dimensional world of La boca del lobo is
the insistent presence of the harsh
Peruvian landscape.
By comparison the Grupo Chaski's
Julianais a paradigmatic example of
small-scale collective filmmaking.

The five-year-old Grupo Chaski collective is a grass-roots organization
with more than 30 members that
produces, distributes, and exhibits
its films and videos.
Juliana'sscript was developed
collectively after researching the
plight of homeless girls in the streets
of Lima. Co-directed by group
members Fernando Espinoza and
Alejandro Legaspi,Julianais impressive because of the astounding performances of street children transformed into actors, its vivid location
cinematography, and narrative complexity. The film begins as a standard
semi-documentary account of the difficulties of one girl's home life with
an abusive and exploitative stepfather and of her decision to follow
in her brother's footsteps and join a
street gang disguised as a boy. Slowly,
however, the story becomes a resolutely fictional odyssey with magical
overtones. As the children "work" for
tips as musicians on city buses, they
bond and form allegiances and resist
the exploitation of the man who "protects" them. Eventually they escape
from his clutches into an almost magical world where each can assume
their true identities (e.g., Juliana can
be a girl again) and where, in control
of their own bus, they ride joyfully in
freedom through the streets of nighttime Lima. The film's power lies in
its simplicity and its appeal to a purely
fictional, magical universe that distinguishes it from the trite slice-of-life
Neo-Realist tradition and from the
seamless, illusionist, and manipulative
"Hollywood" style of filmmaking.
As long as films like Julianacontinue to be produced, the future of
Latin American cinema as a unique
practice and as a mode of filmmaking intimately linked to sociopolitical
problems and to the creative, magical
power of a Latin American vision
seem assured. As Fernando Solanas
declared at the premiere of his film
Sur, "Films are made so that people
can take them away." But for people
to "take them away" productively, the
films themselves must echo the life
invoked byJuliana at the end of her
film-a life "made out of the same
fabric as dreams." .
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Pilgrimage Betrayed? Old Gringo
by Ildn Stavans

trend has emerged
among Latin American
film directors. They are
increasingly making the
pilgrimage from the
periphery of filmmaking
to its centers-either Los
Angeles, the mecca, or Paris, where
technical facilities and financial support are available to leading artists
from underdeveloped countries.
After achieving considerable success
in their native lands, many of the
most talented Latin American filmmakers are being hired by major studios in Hollywood and France to
write scripts, direct films, and serve
as project consultants.
For both the studios and the
directors, the rationale is clear. Studio insiders believe the Latin American directors are the most capable of
reproducing the spirit of their home
milieu, and that under substantial
pressure such directors can deliver
commercially appealing products for
the US or European market. The
foreign directors gain the luxury of
working with superstars and huge
budgets. Given the exasperating economic and technical conditions in
Latin America, the lure is powerful.
Yet the pilgrimage is not without
cost: artists working in a foreign
idiom and an unfamiliar environment may surrender their personal
styles.
One example is the experience of
Argentine director Hector Babenco,
who scored internationally with his
Latin American-made film Pixote,
a compelling, unsentimental portrait of homeless Brazilian youths

Ildn Stavans teaches Latin American
cinema and literatureat Columbia
University.
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Old Gringo's Gregory Peck,Jimmy Smits, and Jane Fonda, with director Luis Puenzo and author
Carlos Fuentes. (Courtesy of Columbia Pictures)

exploited by criminals, mistreated in
reform schools, and involved in
seemingly every sort of street crime.
Pixote's critical and commercial success opened to Babenco the doors to
the power and money of Hollywood's
inner circle. He acquired the rights
to Mario Puig's novel Kiss of the Spider
Woman, gained access to an immense
studio-distribution network, and cast
three stars in the title roles: William
Hurt, Raul Julia, and Sonia Braga.
The result was less experimental and
authentic than his earlier films. But
audiences loved Kiss of the Spider
Woman, and its reception prompted
Babenco to immerse himself in the
US production style. His next film,
however, was catastrophic. Ironweed,
set in Albany, New York, during the
Great Depression, starred Jack
Nicholson and Meryl Streep, but
failed to show the imprint of
Babenco's personal style.
Other examples are Brazil's Ruy
Guerra, Mexico's Luis Mandoki, and
Argentina's Luis Puenzo. Puenzo's

La historiaoficial, a psychological
perspective on the desaparecidosin
Buenos Aires during the aftermath
of the dictatorship, earned him the
1985 Academy Award for Best Foreign Film. His Old Gringo, financed
by Hollywood and directed with
pomp and fanfare, is an epic tale
about US writer Ambrose Bierce, set
against the backdrop of the Mexican
Revolution. Based on the novel by
Carlos Fuentes, the screenplay, coauthored by Puenzo and La historia
oficial scriptwriter Aida Bortnik,
portrays Bierce's final days trying to
find Pancho Villa in Chihuahua.
The movie shows the symptoms of
the illness. Old Gringowas filmed on
location in Mexico with an all-star
cast. Jane Fonda (who owns the
novel's film rights and promoted the
project) stars as schoolteacher Harriet Winslow, with Gregory Peck as
Bierce, Jimmy Smits as General
Toms Arroyo, and Pedro Armendariz Jr. as Villa. Despite the story
line's considerable potential, the

results are poor. No doubt Puenzo
and Bortnik improved Fuentes's labyrinthine prose. Yet the dialogue,
which seems to have been drafted in
Spanish and translated to English, is
bombastic and hence not believable.
While the cognoscenti recognize
Bierce as well as the fact that this is
an imaginary account of what happened to him after he vanished
across the Mexican border in 1914,
the uninitiated viewer suffers from a
lack of background information and
cannot see the film is partially based
on historical reality.
Not wanting to betray his past,
Puenzo convinced the film's producers to use subtitles in some segments, an unpopular device in the
US because it makes films look "foreign." Old Gringo injects a good dose
of Spanish slang into the mouths of
peasants and lieutenants and leaves
English to the Americans. This pattern delivers some unconvincing
moments: although many of the Mexican generals were illiterate, here they
unfailingly communicate with Bierce
and Winslow in well-spoken English.
As an Argentine, the director portrays the Mexican Revolution in picturesque, cartoonish terms. The
music is folkloric. Inspired by Sergei
Einsenstein's iQue viva Mixico!, the
film's texture is candid, yet unreal
and unbalanced. Puenzo seems to
discover the delights of a large-scale
production, but loses control when
he overemphasizes the battle scenes,
shooting them in virtually every
possible camera angle.
Old Gringo is the latest evidence
of the damage inflicted on the style
of talented Latin American filmmakers by their pilgrimage to the
north. Wouldn't it be better, then, for
filmmakers like Puenzo and Babenco
to stay home, grapple with Latin
America's severe limitations, and use
them to create a more authentic, personal art? The answer is no. Experimentation, while no guarantor of
artistic success, is essential to creative growth. After such films,
Puenzo, Babenco, and others may
return to their native soil and demonstrate to the world an unquestionable mastery of their craft. .
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Latin America's Castles in Spain
by Alan Riding

After

of renewal, relations
between Spain and Latin
America are cooling.
Much to Latin America's
chagrin, Spain's demandmore than a decade
ing new marriage to the
European Economic Community
(EEC) is diverting the mother country's attention from her transatlantic
offspring.
With the end of the Franco regime in 1975, the mother country
suddenly recovered her respectability and relieved Latin Americans
could once again feel warmly about
Spain. Seven years later, the rapprochement accelerated with the
election of a socialist government
under Felipe Gonzalez, a man well
known in Latin America and well
informed about its problems. With
Spain's entry into the EEC in 1986,
Latin Americans felt reassured that,
through Spain, their interests would
at last be represented in the crucial
council of nations.
Spain, in turn, enjoyed its revived
popularity in Latin America. Not
only were Gonzlez and King Juan
Carlos feted whenever they visited
the New World, but so too was
Adolfo SuArez, who as prime minister between 1975 and 1981 was the

Alan Riding is senior correspondent
and Parisbureau chieffor the New
York Times.
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architect of Spain's transition from
dictatorship to democracy. Dusting
off the old idea of hispanidad,Spain
also began spending heavily on cultural promotion. It felt its special ties
to Latin America would give it extra
clout in Europe, and with the 500th
anniversary of Columbus's voyage
fast approaching, hoped that only
the positive features of its colonial
legacy would be remembered.

So what went wrong? Why do so
many Latin Americans today feel
neglected by Spain? Why has Spain
failed to fulfill Latin America's
expectations? And why, notwithstanding flowery speeches to the contrary, has Spain's European option
forced it to turn its back on Latin
America?

The Pre-Nuptial Agreement
The fact is that Spain's priority was to
end generations of isolation from
Europe by joining the EEC's process
of economic and political integration. To win acceptance, however,
Spain was in no position to lay down
conditions. On the contrary,
Gonzalez had to drop his objections
to Spain's membership in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, lift the
blockade of Gibraltar, and agree to a
transition to full EEC membership of
only seven years, a painfully short
period given the country's relative
backwardness.
Simultaneously Spain had to
abandon any thoughts of extracting
for Latin America the same tradeand-aid privileges enjoyed by former
British, Belgian, and French colonies. Other European governments
argued that the EEC already had to
channel huge resources into Spain
itself if the new member were to
catch up with the rest. They also
noted that, with the exception of
Haiti, Latin American countries were
not among the world's "deeply poor"
and that some, like Brazil and Mexico, were potential economic powers
in their own right.
So if Spain could not serve as a
bridge to the EEC, what could it do?
In order to survive in Europe, it
needed to spend all its energies and
resources on modernizing its economy and on raising the standard of
living in a country where social wel-

fare was thoroughly inadequate. Put
differently, with Spain busily importing capital for its own development,
it had little to spare for loans and
investment in Latin America. Even
trade with the region fell during
the 1980s.
Gonzalez was all too conscious of
the gap between Spain's words and
actions. To compensate, he organized
a ministerial meeting between the
European Twelve and Latin America's Group of Eight during his term
as EEC president. He also triedunsuccessfully-to have the Latin
American debt crisis debated at the
European summit in Madrid in June
1989. He continued to receive droves
of Latin American leaders and even
Prh
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aches rather than opportunities.
Unlike the US, Western Europe
also feels no particular responsibility
to help Latin America. Some Spanish
intellectuals may be embarrassed by
the results of three centuries of
Spanish rule in Latin America, but
the major European powers-West
Germany, Britain, and France-are
happy to see Washington assume the
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also at fault. It looked to Spain to
open its doors to Europe, but the
problem lay not in any betrayal of
promises by Spain but rather in
Latin America's image in Europe.
Today, Western Europe is absorbed
not only by the complexity of its own
moves towards economic and political unity but also by the rapidly evolving situation in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Western Europe is
preparing to compete with the US
and Japan while confronting past
European problems; it has little time
for a Latin America that offers head-

burden of easing Latin America's
debt crisis and bolstering its fragile
democracies. Latin America is a sort
of hobby for many Europeans: they
protest human rights violations,
worry about disappearing Indian
tribes, and complain about Amazon
deforestation, but they are reluctant
to become more deeply involved.
For European investors, bankers,
and governments to take a stronger
interest in Latin America, it must
prove itself more economically viable.
That, of course, passes responsibility
to Latin America. In the 1980s the
region's share of world trade, investments, and credits gradually diminished, and it became apparent that
most Latin American governments
have failed to address their own
problems. If anything, the foreign
debt crisis has become an excuse for
inaction. The European response has
been that if Latin American countries cannot help themselves, why
should anyone else step in to perpetuate economic absurdities?
All, however, is not lost. On the
one hand, once the EEC has passed
its own watershed in 1992, it will soon

be energetically searching for new
markets and investment opportunities in the Third World. On the
other hand, when countries like
Chile, Mexico, and perhaps even
Argentina have dared to reorganize
their economies, European interest
has quickly come alive. Even Spain,
albeit cautiously, has begun looking
beyond its own borders.
For now at least, Spain's most
useful role in Latin America is as a
model. In political terms it has demonstrated that a solid democracy can
be born of an authoritarian tradition,
even to the point of depoliticizing
armed forces long accustomed to
being in power. In economic terms it
has shown that, by closing down or
privatizing inefficient state enterprises
and by welcoming foreign investment,
recessions can give way to rapid
growth. Latin Americans are right in
looking to Spain, but as a guide
rather than a savior; it can do little
more than point a way out of Latin
America's political, economic, and
intellectual quagmire. .
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architect of Spain's transition from
dictatorship to democracy. Dusting
off the old idea of hispanidad,Spain
also began spending heavily on cultural promotion. It felt its special ties
to Latin America would give it extra
clout in Europe, and with the 500th
anniversary of Columbus's voyage
fast approaching, hoped that only
the positive features of its colonial
legacy would be remembered.
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So what went wrong? Why do so
many Latin Americans today feel
neglected by Spain? Why has Spain
failed to fulfill Latin America's
expectations? And why, notwithstanding flowery speeches to the contrary, has Spain's European option
forced it to turn its back on Latin
America?
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itself if the new member were to
catch up with the rest. They also
noted that, with the exception of
Haiti, Latin American countries were
not among the world's "deeply poor"
and that some, like Brazil and Mexico, were potential economic powers
in their own right.
So if Spain could not serve as a
bridge to the EEC, what could it do?
In order to survive in Europe, it
needed to spend all its energies and
resources on modernizing its economy and on raising the standard of
living in a country where social wel-
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differently, with Spain busily importing capital for its own development,
it had little to spare for loans and
investment in Latin America. Even
trade with the region fell during

the 1980s.
Gonzalez was all too conscious of
the gap between Spain's words and
actions. To compensate, he organized
a ministerial meeting between the
European Twelve and Latin America's Group of Eight during his term
as EEC president. He also triedunsuccessfully-to have the Latin
American debt crisis debated at the
European summit in Madrid in June
1989. He continued to receive droves
of Latin American leaders and even
echoed some of their concerns when
he met President Bush in Washington
in October 1989. Beyond that, there
was not much more he could do.
Now the outlook is for even more
delicate relations between Spain and
Latin America to cast a shadow over
the 500th anniversary celebrations of
Columbus's discovery in 1992. At
present, Latin American citizens can
still enter Spain without a visa, but
when Europe eliminates its internal
borders after 1992, the same immigration requirements will be adopted
by all EEC members. The rest of the
EEC has made it clear to Spain that
Latin Americans will need to obtain
visas, and so a bureaucratic procedure for Europe will become a disturbing symbol for Latin America.
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open its doors to Europe, but the
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promises by Spain but rather in
Latin America's image in Europe.
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and Japan while confronting past
European problems; it has little time
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A New Dark Age for Latin America?
by David Ronfeldt

sliding into a new dark age,
and there may not be
America
be
much
the US seems
can dotoabout
it. According to most analysts, the rise of civilian
democratic regimes in the
1980s signified the region's emergence
from the harsh military regimes
and "dirty wars" of the 1970s. If the
US and its neighbors would just cooperate and do the right things about
debt and other issues, democracy
would take root, economic growth
would be restored, and US-Latin
American relations would enter a
bright new era.
The analysts also said that the
emergence of a multipolar international system and the relaxation of
US-Soviet tensions would benefit
Latin America. Polarizing conflicts
between left and right would diminish; toleration and accommodation
of the left would grow; and the US
would no longer feel threatened by
radical change. The region's nations
would be able to emphasize economic rather than security concerns,
diversify and expand their trade and
investment relations abroad, reduce
their historic dependency on the US,
proceed with regional economic integration, and assume new international leadership roles. Meanwhile, if
the major powers built regional trade
blocs, US interest in collaborating
with Latin America would increase.
Such thinking has dominated
intellectual and policy dialogue since
the democracy trend began in the
early 1980s. Its proponents now
sound less optimistic; they add warnings as debt, drugs, and other
problems continue to jeopardize

Satin
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democratic trends. Yet their hopefulness persists. The scenario of a democratic future is periodically adjusted;
but it remains widely accepted. Its
credibility even advanced in 1989
with the election of Carlos Andr6s
Perez in Venezuela, Michael Manley
in Jamaica, Alfredo Cristiani in El
Salvador, and Carlos Menem in
Argentina, and with the demise of
the Paraguayan dictator Alfredo
Stroessner. Central American peace
initiatives have periodically added
promise.
Nonetheless, much of Latin
America seems headed toward a different future: the failure of democracy and a plunge into a new dark
age. This grim possibility has grown
with one event after another since
the ugly, forgotten disorders in Haiti
in 1986. Recent events-the political
disarray in Panama, the escalation of
strife in El Salvador, the war between
the drug cartels and the government
in Colombia, and the violence of
Sendero Luminoso in Peru-suggest
that Latin America is entering a new
dark age. Its hallmarks will not be
democracy and development under
moderate civilian leaders.
What would a new dark age look
like? Most countries will remain weak
from economic stagnation and political disarray; doubts about the "superiority of democracy" will resurface;
and dictators and demagogues will
take over-some through elections,
others through force. These occurrences may resemble another cyclical
return to military regimes. But something deeper will be happening: the
rise of a new generation of caudillos
who prefer corporatism to democracy. Their regimes will embrace odd
alliances and contradictory ideological tendencies. Meanwhile extremists
on the right and left will opt for
more barbaric modes of conflict.

In this scenario the Latin America of the 1990s succumbs to the
worst features of the 1930s and
1970s. Yet this time protagonists on
all sides will have access to the latest
information, communications, transportation, and weapons technologies.
The post-Cold War world, far from
bringing peace and prosperity to
Latin America and other Third
World areas, may thus be plagued
with post-industrial modes of political crime and violence, committed by
what often amount to pre-industrial
perpetrators. The latter include
political gangsters, drug lords, and
nativist revolutionaries with backland
mentalities who keep records and
prepare propaganda on computers,
use international electronic mail and
banking services, conduct surveillance with sophisticated video equipment, and communicate with
gunmen via portable radio and telephone systems.

Paths to Darkness
How might this occur? Not because
of single factors like debt or drugs,
but because of varied global,
regional, and, especially, internal
trends that weaken moderate leaders,
arouse antidemocratic forces, and
lessen the constraints on violence. A
new dark age may prove likely if the
following trends continue.
The first such trend is the continued disengagement of the US and
USSR from conflict in Latin America, along with the focus of the US,
the European Economic Community,
and Japan on trade and investment
opportunities elsewhere. Against this
backdrop, it would become difficult
to claim that the US has major interests at stake and should care much
about Latin America strategically,
politically, or economically. Latin

America, then, would drop off the
world's strategic horizons. As the outside democratic powers show less
interest, the dark-age scenario would
become more likely.
A second trend involves Latin
American leaders, including the democratic moderates, hailing the end of
US hegemony and the rise of Latin
American primacy over its own
affairs. Thus the leaders would be
discarding the old Pan-American--or
"One Americas"-vision of hemispheric cooperation in forums like
the Organization of American States,
and opting for a separate-"Two
Americas"-vision that calls on their
region to go its way independently of
the US. This vision, which emphasizes nationalism and solidarity
against the Colossus of the North, is
favored by intellectuals and politicians on the left and right. It is not
inherently democratic. Thus its
embrace not only strains US ties, but
also helps would-be dictators and
political gangsters (like Noriega) to
appeal for popular support and outmaneuver their moderate foes.
Nationalism becomes debased,
reducing the concepts of sovereignty
and dignity to a rhetoric of unprincipled self-assertion and personal
aggrandizement.
A third trend is that, as the two
superpowers disengage, standard
insurgency doctrines that limited violence, and counterinsurgency doctrines that combined political,
economic, and military measures, fall
into disfavor. The US, which sometimes supports rightist forces, has
often constrained right-wing extremists; and the USSR, which sometimes abets revolutionary violence,
has guided leftist strategies and tactics in conventional directions. With
the US and USSR out of the picture,
ideology would decline while racism,
regionalism, and religion would
increase as motives for violence. The
wildest elements on the extreme right
and left would therefore face fewer
constraints on the use of violence.
Hence, not only would terrorism
against individuals increase, but also
the massacre of groups and communities would become a more viable

and desirable option for some extremists. Large-scale migrations and
refugee flows would ensue.

Signs of Danger
The worst signs are already evident
in Peru, Colombia, Panama, and El
Salvador. In Peru, Sendero Luminoso,
which is reminiscent of Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia, controls vast
coca fields. It is close to provoking a
Peruvian army that favors an 'Argentine solution," which may mean
killing hundreds of thousands of
Indians in the Peruvian highlands.
Colombia is being undermined-city
by city, region by region, institution
by institution-by drug cartels, rightwing paramilitary forces, and leftwing revolutionary movements
engaged in crisscrossing battles with
each other, the government, and
the army.
In Panama, Noriega's domination
showed again that peaceful, democratic protest movements based on
the middle classes stand little chance
against political gangsters who are
solidly backed by ruffian security
forces and encouraged by leftists in
Cuba and Nicaragua, not to mention
rightists from Argentina and Colombia. The US military intervention to
oust Noriega and his apparatus
in December 1989 should turn out
well. But if this effort to resume the
democratic scenario results in a prolonged US occupation, political and
economic disarray in Panama, and
intensified anti-Americanism in
Latin America, then it will not prevent the dark scenario. It may instead
fuel the unwelcome thesis that the

US, far from disengaging, will intervene more in Latin America in the
post-Cold War world.
In El Salvador warfare underscores the vulnerability of the country's democratic leadership, the
exhaustion of its people, and the
frightful ability of its extreme left
and right to rejoice in each other's
violence. The FMLN's full-scale
attack in November 1989 seemed
motivated partly by a concern that
the USSR is losing interest in the
region, while the response by the
armed forces (and death squads)
indicated that, under pressure, they
will continue fighting as primitively
as before, despite more than a
decade of US attempts at reform.
Even if Central America's conflicts could be ameliorated, economic
crisis and political fragility augur
badly for the future of democracy
there. Further south, the December
1989 presidential elections in Brazil
and Chile raise hopes that the Southern Cone countries will remain on
the road to economic liberalization
and political democracy. Nevertheless, the failure and regression of
just one of them would confirm the
scenario at hand.
None of this means the US should
give up hope for democratic progress
in Latin America, but some rethinking of US objectives and priorities
may be needed. The democratic scenario invited (limited) US involvement. Yet the dark-age scenarioespecially if US policy actions, like
the intervention in Panama, cannot
keep it from occurring-may suggest
we should keep our distance, channel
our policies through multilateral
mechanisms, and avoid getting
drawn into drug wars and other
murky conflicts. We should expect a
flood of refugees heading for the US.
And we will have all the more reason
to resolve social problems at home, as
well as concentrate on the economic
development and integration of
North America as a whole, including
Mexico and Canada. Indeed, Mexico-based on its economic and political reforms-is an emerging bright
spot, a promising exception to the
prospects elsewhere. .
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Economic Trends: Latin America and the Caribbean
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Britain and the Caribbean's Future
by AnthonyJ Payne

British policy towards the
Caribbean since the end of
World War II has been its
withdrawal from the region's
affairs.
unmistakable
mostThe
striking
feature of
long-term trend has been
retreat from full-scale colonialism to
the possession of a mere handful of
minuscule territories. This trend is
not difficult to explain, especially in
light of the transfer of hegemony
from Britain to the US in the postwar
era. Because the Caribbean is situated in the "backyard" of the US, the
only surprise is the length of time the
process took. As the Universidadde
PuertoRico's (Welsh-born) Gordon
Lewis has noted, the Grenada crisis
constituted "the earthquake that
records on the seismic graph the
moment of that transition" in the
Commonwealth Caribbean (Grenada:
The Jewel Despoiled, 1987).
Yet the embarrassment caused by
the Grenada crisis provoked the British government into an acknowledged reappraisal of its Caribbean
policy. A passage in an official statement on the British government's
handling of the invasion period (presented to the House of Commons in
June 1984) recognized "an increased
American involvement in the Caribbean" as a fact of life. The passage
declared the conviction, however, that
this trend "need not inhibit Britain
from maintaining a distinctive policy
towards the area."

The

Toward a New Postcolonial Role?
The Foreign Office was unquestionably stung by the allegation, widely

Anthonyj Payne is a lecturer in
politics at the University of Sheffield,
England.
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made in October 1983, that Britain
had turned its back on the region.
Since then it has devoted considerable effort to reassessing British policy towards the Caribbean and,
above all, to widening its focus
beyond a narrow preoccupation with
Cold War issues. Even so, in the
immediate aftermath of Grenada,
security emerged as the item that
topped the agenda.

Following the Grenada crisis,
Britain increased its assistance in the
provision of equipment and training
to the police and security forces of
the Caribbean. Such assistance
focuses on the Eastern Caribbean
states and includes financial and
technical support for the Regional
Security System set up between Barbados and these states in 1984. In
addition Britain quietly reinstituted a
military exchange program with the
Jamaica Defence Force. These measures have given Britain a renewed
security presence in the Caribbean
beyond the special case of its commitment to Belize. According to official

thinking, this presence gives the
region an alternative to reliance on
the US for defense assistance.
After the Grenada affair and
beginning in September 1985 with
the "Exotic Palm" exercise, British
army, naval, and air force personnel
have regularly participated in USorganized training maneuvers in the
Caribbean. To this extent, Britain
has demonstrated its willingness to
contribute to the defense of general
Western security interests in the
Caribbean. It has done so in a way
that ultimately sustains US military
dominance over the region.
Other policy initiatives launched
since 1984 have concerned the
remaining British dependencies and
the growing problem of drugs. From
London's perspective, the two are
related. The 1985 drug-related arrest
in Miami of the chief minister of the
Turks and Caicos Islands generated a
scandal that shook the British government and caused it to reexamine
policy towards its Caribbean dependent territories. As announced in
December 1987, the new British
stance was that "we would not urge
them to consider moving to independence," although the government
remained "ready to respond positively when this is the clearly and
constitutionally expressed wish of
the people." Meanwhile Britain
would implement "a number of
administrative measures to improve
the effectiveness with which we
discharge our obligations."
Despite its careful wording, the
statement represented a significant
shift of approach. In the past the
assumption had been that, sooner or
later, the dependencies would progress to independence; the current
attitude favors their remaining under
residual British control. Independence was still there for the asking,

but it was not to be the presumed
outcome. Moreover, for as long as the
British government retained responsibility for the territories, it would
exercise its role actively rather than
passively.
This meant, among other things,
that Britain would have to address
the drug problem. The Foreign
Office conducted a review of the
drug situation in all other British
dependent territories in the Caribbean in 1987 and introduced a
number of policy changes. These
included the establishment and
strengthening of police antidrug
units, the improvement of surveillance and interdiction, and the promotion of tougher antidrug
legislation. The approach was later
applied to the independent states of
the English-speaking Caribbean, in
conjunction with the US government
but with the consent of the countries
concerned. In practice the drugs
arena became another instance of
close cooperation between London
and Washington.
Besides these relatively new policy
concerns are the long-standing questions of Britain's military presence
in Belize and the perennial issues of
trade, investment, and aid. British
diplomacy quietly seeks to facilitate a
resolution of the territorial dispute
between Belize and Guatemala, but
of late there has been no great pressure in London to rescind the
unusual postcolonial defense commitment to Belize. As for economic
issues, the Thatcher government is
alarmed at how far Britain's trading
position with the Caribbean has
slipped and is trying to become a
more visible actor in forums such as
the Caribbean/Central American
Action's annual Miami conference.
British aid to the Caribbean continues, but not yet resolved is the fate
of the preferential access enjoyed by
Caribbean rum and bananas to the
European Economic Community
after the single market is completed

in 1992.
In short, since 1984 Britain has
unquestionably become more active
in Caribbean affairs, focusing its
energies on the Commonwealth

Caribbean. As a player of significance
on the world stage in its own right,
Cuba gets noticed, but the traumas
of Haiti after the fall of the Duvaliers
or the growing problems of the
Dominican Republic do not generally
receive much official British attention. The British Embassy in Santo
Domingo was, in fact, closed in 1985.
Even so, British resumption of a limited Caribbean role is significant and
needs to be explained.

British Motives
Three alternative, though not
mutually incompatible, explanations
suggest themselves. The first concerns
the question of image, as mentioned
by the minister responsible for the
Caribbean in the Foreign Office,
Baroness Young, in her 1984 "reappraisal" speech when she denied that
Britain had turned away from the
Caribbean. Baroness Young pointed
out that Caribbean prime ministers
and chief ministers visited London,
and British ministers the Caribbean,
so regularly and in such noncontroversial fashion that these events
often went unnoticed by the media.
The result, she said, was "a feeling
that little is going on." Accordingly,
she stated, the government intended
to take positive steps to protect its
interests in the region. Since 1984
Britain has achieved more than a
readjustment of its image in the
Caribbean, but the raised profile of
this period was one of the goals set
out in the policy review.
The second explanation concerns
the US and insists that, in not so
many words after the Grenada affair,
the Americans told Britain to play a
bigger part in protecting Western
interests in the Caribbean. The
extent of Anglo-American security
and intelligence cooperation in
general can hardly be exaggerated
and certainly applies to the Caribbean. Certainly too, US officials at
both State and Defense perceive
Britain as having "returned" to the
region, a shift they unreservedly
welcome. In the long term, British
security assistance reinforces US
control over the Caribbean. In the

short term, however, it provides an
alternative for troubled or beleaguered regional states. Without question, strong US input influenced
Britain's post-Grenada reconsideration of its role in the Caribbean. Yet
it does not follow, even under the
Thatcher administration, that Britain
obeys every instruction given it by
the US.
The third explanation is the one
argued, especially in the last year
or so, by the present Conservative
British government. In a speech in
June 1988, Tim Eggar, who assumed
ministerial responsibility for the
Caribbean following the resignation
of Baroness Young, addressed the
question of Britain's relations with
the region. Riding quickly over
the traditional ties of history and
sentiment (which have preoccupied
so many official British statements
on the Caribbean in recent years),
Eggar observed that "if asked to put
my money in a sound investment,
I would look to a relationship based
firmly on sound mutuality of
interest." This statement struck a new
note in the long history of AngloCaribbean relations. As Eggar
elaborated, the Caribbean can now
offer a weaker, postimperial Britain a
number of benefits. These include a
significant market for British goods
and investment, a large number of
potential votes at the UN for causes
of importance to Britain (such as the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict), a base
from which to fight the international
drug menace, and a political force
for the preservation of democracy in
the world.
The importance of the Caribbean
benefits to Britain is not clear. What
is clear is that the British government
has begun to see its relationship with
the Caribbean in these terms. This
suggests, above all, that Britain's
post-1984 reinvolvement in Caribbean affairs flowed mainly from a
hard-headed assessment of what
British interests are in the region.
Though it is too early to tell, this
reappraisal may mark the beginning
of the end of the postcolonial phase
of Britain's relations with the
Caribbean. .
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Brazilian Prospects

Sair da Crise
by CarlosLuque et al.Instituto
Brasileiro de Capacitactio Bancaria,
1988. 147 pp. Paperback.

Economic Solutions?
by Thomas P Noonan
Every time the Wall StreetJournal
mentions Brazil, it adds a simple parenthetical phrase: "the country with
the largest foreign debt." It's a statement echoed by the New York Times,
the Miami Herald, the Chicago
Tribune, and every other major
newspaper in the world. It is also
completely inaccurate, since the foreign debt of the US is six times larger
than Brazil's and growing at a much
faster rate. Confronted with these
facts, leading newspapers seem to
say, "Well, O.K., but we meant in
comparative or proportional terms,
such as compared with GDP." Once
again, they are embarrassingly far off
the mark. Brazil's total foreign debt
of $111 billion is 23% of Brazil's GDP.
Mexico's foreign debt of $100 billion
is 51% of its GDP, and Argentina's
foreign debt of $58 billion is 99% of
its GDP. Nigeria, Poland, the Philip-

Thomas P Noonan is an executive in
the internationalfinancialservices
business with extensive experience in
Brazil.
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pines, and Venezuela all have
substantially worse debt/GDP
ratios than Brazil. Why, then, the
consistent error?
The answer is not difficult: Brazil
is the world's least known, least
analyzed, and least worried-about
superpower. Neither the Wall Street
Journalnor the Miami Herald,for
example, bothers to note that the
Brazilian economy is three times the
size of Taiwan's and two and a half
times the size of Korea's. In fact,
it's the world's eighth largest noncommunist economy, right behind
better-known economic giants such
as the UK and Canada. Since Brazil's
economic size is underestimated,
its rank in the "foreign-debt hierarchy" also appears to be much
higher than it really is.
The book at hand, Sair da Crise,
is a well-reasoned discussion of Brazil's major economic problems and
solutions. Its authors are five Brazilian economists-Carlos Luque,
Guilherme Dias, Paulo de Tarso
Soares, Roberto Macedo, and Simio
Silber-who are, or have been,
associated with the prestigious economics department of the Universidade de S(to Paulo. As a five-author collaboration, the book suffers from an
occasional discontinuity in style and
focus, but more important, it is
nonpolitical, quiet in tone, and scholarly without getting lost in academic
minutiae. The book succinctly covers
the predictable litany of ills. Yet, if the

choice of ills is predictable, the suggested responses are frequently
surprising.

Problems and Solutions
The discussion of Brazil's economic
crisis begins, appropriately, with its
public sector. The discussion traces
the origin of the estado empresdrio, or
"state-as-engine-for-growth," from
the end of World War II to the 1980s.
During this period the public sector
grew so much faster than the private
sector that it came to represent
almost two-thirds of Brazil's GDP.
Unfortunately this absorbed much
more in the way of resources than it
produced.
By the mid-1980s the growth
of the public sector ran out of gas
because it exhausted all possible
methods of financing, while the Brazilian people and the congress lost
faith in the public sector's ability to
pull the private sector in its wake. Of
the two, the financing problem is the
most intractable; the obvious sources
of finance have been exhausted without the appearance of any new candidates. The other problem-the
negative image of the public sector as
a free-spending wastrel making sweet
deals with privileged friends-is a
lesser threat because it can be turned
around by a new government willing
to get tough on abuses.
The authors explain that during
the 1950s the main financing method

M

was the printing press. During this
decade recourse to direct money creation did not lead to hyperinflation
because Brazil emerged from World
War II with a low rate of inflation
and large foreign reserves. Hence
the country managed to live with a
relatively high level of monetary
expansion for several years without
disastrous results.
The favored form of financing
during the 1960s was internal debt,
as the state emphasized the selling of
government debt instruments
-bonds, notes, and bills-to individual and institutional investors. During the 1970s another shift occurred,
as Brazil resorted to massive foreign
borrowing. From less than $10 billion
in 1972, the country's foreign debt
ballooned to more than $90 billion in
1982. Since 1983 virtually no new voluntary financing has been available
from abroad. Brazil has therefore
reverted to both the printing press
and to internal debt, but seems to
have reached the limits of both.
Recognizing the central role of
the public sector in both the problem
and the solution, Carlos Luque and
his colleagues make a series of
thoughtful, practical suggestions for
reform. They cite the need to decentralize much of the administrative
apparatus. Extreme centralization,
say the authors, is inefficient and
undemocratic in a country the size of
Brazil. They go on to advocate
devolving a substantial amount of
authority from the federal government to the state governments, which
should continue to depend on the
federal government for funding. The
authors argue such dependence is
necessary given the inability of the
states to fund themselves directly.
In discussing Brazil's tax structure, the authors stress one of its
major problems: over the past 25

years the federal government has
given away a large part of its revenue
base through a bewildering series of
tax incentives. Government leadership has used such incentives to
channel investments into the northeast, the Amazon, export programs,
and numerous other activities that it
deemed to require encouragement
and help. Yet, once tax incentives are
in place, it is no easy task to eliminate
them: their powerful beneficiaries
come to regard them as an acquired

right.
One wishes the book would have
focused upon the effects of the state's
incessant tinkering with the economy
and the consequent growth of the
bureaucracy to control and monitor
these "engines for growth." From
1985 to 1989 the Sarney government

added more than 500,000 people
to the public payroll, many of them
ostensibly to perform monitoring
functions, but others to hold fictitious jobs in which the salary is
divided between benefactor and beneficiary. Brazilians widely acknowledge that a large number of
positions in the public sector are
phantom jobs. The existence of a
bloated, convoluted bureaucracy
with a constantly evolving set of programs makes it easy for government
leadership to defend the jobs by
pointing to the need for an evergrowing body of civil servants. For
example, the authors pinpoint the
Instituto Brasileirodo Cafe and the
Instituto do Alco61 e Acucar as candidates for immediate elimination. But
these useless bureaucracies have survived on legislative hit-lists for years
because enough people with political
clout have a vested interest in them.
During the last 20 years Brazil
has experienced explosive growth in
soybean production and exports, rising
from virtually
nothing
to second
--virtuall. nothing
.........
s con

place, behind the US, in world production. When asked what contributed most to this phenomenal
expansion, a leading Brazilian soybean grower replied, "We were successful in resisting the creation of a
Brazilian Soybean Institute, which
would have killed the business:'
The same can be said for orange
juice, another spectacular success
over the past 15 years. Brazil has
come from nowhere to become the
world's largest producer of orange
juice concentrate. The growers
cringe in horror at the thought of
"LARANJABRAS" (a Brazilian
orange institute). Fortunately, today's
mistrust of the federal bureaucracy
means that no such monster is in
the offing.
Sair da Crise analyzes a series of
key issues that transcend the ills of
the public sector. The problem of
income distribution, for example, is
addressed throughout the volume,
and rightfully so. Simply put, Brazil's
rich are getting richer and its poor
are getting not only poorer but
much more numerous. The top onequarter of the population today
absorbs more than 70% of Brazil's
income, compared with 62.5%
in 1960.
The volume examines the problem of income distribution not simply in terms of fairness, but also in
terms of its inevitable effect on labormanagement relations and government efforts to combat runaway
inflation. Until labor leaders see
some hard evidence of a reversal in
the trend toward income polarization, they will maintain their posture
of class warfare. The policy upshot is
that the widening gap between rich
and poor undercuts official attempts
to tame inflation, since any successful policy would require a labor-

management-government pact that
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holds together for more than three
months. Brazil's growing concentration of wealth stands in the way of
negotiations to piece together such a
tripartite pact. In turn the inability
to form a pactjeopardizes the longrange vitality of the Brazilian

economy.

Cambridge University Press
Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship
Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Editor
British relations with Latin America have deteriorated in this century. The strength of
British influence in Latin America in the nineteenth century, based on trade and
investment, could not be sustained during the two world wars and the intervening
depression; and the war between Britain and Argentina in 1982 brought home the
extent of the worsening relations in a spectacular manner. This book examines the

reasons for this decline in the relationship and explores prospects for strengthening

Groping for Solutions
The way out of the crisis requires

tough measures across several
fronts. Beyond the need to attack the
deep-seated ills of the public sector
and reverse the alarming trend in
income inequality, the Brazilian
economy must be opened up to the
rigors of international competition.
The closed, comfortable Brazilian
version of import substitution
-which revolves around elaborate
forms of protection for local manufacturers-requires complicated sur-

gery. Among the entrepreneurs who
have struggled to import the most
basic industrial components into
Brazil, few would disagree. The chapter on distortions caused by Brazil's
system of protectionism is incisive
and should be required reading for
all investors who may have the misfortune of having to import something into Brazil in the near future.
In spite of the horror stories, Sair
da Crise leaves the reader with a sense
of optimism. Brazil became an economic heavyweight by following an
unusual mixture of good and awful
economic policies. If most of the
good can be maintained while correcting some of the ills addressed in
the book, it is not impossible to envision a Brazil in the year 2000 that is
ready to sit at the same table with the
OECD superpowers that today still
seem to be playing in a different
league.
The Collor de Mello government
that takes office in 1990 will confront
a fundamental challenge: it must
convince key sectors of the economy
to sign up for a new set of economic
reforms that will sound like many
of the broken promises of the past
five years. The job will be tough, but
it is doable under the right
management. .
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Hardcover$44.50

relations in the 1990s.

The Political Economy of Central America since 1920
Victor Bulmer-Thomas
a welcome addition to the burgeoning literature on Central America

The book is

an invaluable compilation of economic data, much of which the author has pieced
together from primary sources. Perhaps more impressive, however, is the author's success in analytically integrating aspects of historical change that too often are kept separate or treated in a misleading framework of linear causality:' - Hispanic-American
HistoricalReview
Hardcover$49.50/Paperback $16.95
Cambridge Latin American Studies

The Politics of Latin American Development, Third Edition
Gary W Wynia
This popular introduction to Latin American politics probes behind the current events
and reveals the fundamental economic and political dynamics shaping events and

driving policy. Chapters are devoted to democratic reform, military authoritarianism,
and revolutionary politics with detailed examples from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela.

Hardcover about $49.50/Paperbackabout $14.95

Four Titles in the Ford/Southampton Studies
in North/South Security Relations

The Central American
Security System

Conflict and Consensus

Peter Calvert, Editor
This study focuses on the concept of

Caroline Thomas and
Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu,
Editors

security in Central America and the
Caribbean, and on perceptions by
states in the region of the rival claims

of political independence, economic
well-being, national security, and
regional stability.
Contributors: Peter Calvert, lan
Forbes, Paul Sutton, George Philip,

Alistair Hennessy, Eduardo Crawley,
Caroline Thomas,Julian Saurin, Martin
C. Needler, and Tony Thorndike.
Hardcover $39.50

The Soviet Union and

the Strategy of NonAlignment in the Third
World
Roy Allison
In a survey of Soviet attitudes toward

the large group of Third World
countries outside the primary
alliances, generally referred to as the

non-aligned states, the book assesses
the policy implications of Soviet views
on neutrality, non-alignment, the NonAligned Movement, neutralization, and
alignment in the Third World.
Hardcover $39.50

in South/North Security

In this volume, thirteen distinguished
contributors address this pressing
issue of security relations between
"developed" and "developing" states.
Contributors: Caroline Thomas,
Aswini K. Ray, John Simpson, Marc
Williams, Graham Bird, Paikiasothy
Saravanamuttu, Christopher Coker,

Stephany Griffith-Jones, Stephan
Thomas, Matin Zuberi, Phil Williams,
George Joffe, and Paul Wilkinson
Hardcover$44.50

Superpower
Competition and Crisis

Prevention in the Third
World
Roy Allison and Phil Williams,
Editors
In this central study, specialists from a
variety of backgrounds examine
superpower security policies in the
Third World in general, and consider a
range of specific regional conflicts in
which both superpowers have been
involved.

Hardcover about $49.50

At bookstores or order from

Cambridge University Press
40 West 20th Street, NY, NY 10011.Call toll-free: 800-872-7423, outside NY State.

800-227-0247 NY State only MasterCard/VISA accepted. Prices subject to change.

Rethinking Military Politics:
Brazil and the Southern Cone
by Alfred Stepan. Princeton University Press, 1988. 167 pp.
Paperback.

Democratization
and the Military
by Paul W Drake
In the flood of recent writings on
democratization, surprisingly few
have targeted what may well be the
single most important actor- the
armed forces. Thankfully, one of the
hemisphere's leading experts on
Latin American armed forces, Alfred
Stepan, addresses the question of
"how to manage the military democratically." He accomplishes a
remarkable amount in his brief but
pithy volume. The reader is left with a
sobering picture of the continuing
autonomous power of armed forces
within states returning to civilian
government.

Institutional Patterns
In studies of military rule in Latin
America, three schools have predominated: the cultural, the structural,
and the institutional. Cultural proponents, like HowardJ. Wiarda,
attribute authoritarianism to the
deeply-rooted hierarchical, paternalistic values of the Iberian colonial
past. The structural school, exemplified by John J. Johnson, Jose Nun,
and Guillermo O'Donnell, seeks the
wellsprings of military behavior in
underlying social and economic conditions, such as the rise of the middle
class or the stagnation of industrialization. A third cluster of specialists
stresses institutional variables, focusing on the legal, corporate, and internal elements that condition military
policies and actions. Stepan has been
Paul W.Drake is professor ofpolitical
science and directorof the Centerfor
Iberianand Latin American Studies at
the University of California,San
Diego.

closest to the latter school in analyzing military politics.
Stepan is concerned with the
roles of the military in authoritarian
regimes, in transitions toward
democracy, in the consolidation of
democracies, and in conflict with
civilian contenders for power.
Although concentrating on Brazil, he
draws comparisons with Argentina,
Uruguay, Chile, and Spain. From
these cases he casts generalizations
for broader theories about military
behavior.
As in his previous work on the
breakdown of democratic regimes,
Stepan rejects deterministic models.
He insists on the significance of
sequence, choice, and statecraft in
producing results. In other words
the success of democratization
hinges, in part, on the decisions of
policymakers at crucial junctures,
within the boundaries Stepan sets.
With his map of the land mines and
pitfalls of democratization, and a certain amount of luck, democratic
leaders may be able to solidify civilian rule.
The first section of the book deals
with the expansion of military functions and powers while they governed
the country. This section pays particular attention to the growth of intelligence agencies, which threatened
not only civilians but also elements of
the armed services. In Brazil the dangerous autonomy of the Servigo
Nacional de Informages, Brazil's chief
intelligence agency, led some regular
officers to join civilians in a preference for liberalization.
The second segment of the book
examines the military during the
transition toward democracy. Stepan
explores the officers' motivations and
mechanisms for opening up the political system. Through a fascinating
discourse analysis, he shows that Brazil's national security doctrine
evolved to encompass liberalization,
but stopped short of accepting
unconstrained democratization.
Although emphasizing military initiatives and maneuvers in the transition process, Stepan includes the
impact of opposing civilian social
and political organizations, which

can stretch the opening farther than
the armed forces had envisioned. He
conceptualizes this struggle as a dialectic between "regime concession
and societal conquest:'
The third portion of the book
unveils remaining barriers to democratic control over the armed services. These final chapters are the
most innovative, comparative, exciting, and ominous. Stepan indicates
that the degree of military manipulation of the transition largely determines the scope of the military's
authority thereafter. In a closely
guided democratization such as Brazil's, the armed forces normally
retain great autonomy and tutelage.
Stepan assesses the military's
strength in new democracies by
employing the concepts of "contestation" and "prerogatives." The fragility of civilian rule depends on the
intensity of military conflict with the
successor government and the extent
of the military's continuing institutional privileges. Contestation normally revolves around settlements of
previous human rights abuses,
respect for the services' organizational integrity, and allocations to the
budget. A long list of prerogatives
would include established roles for
the armed forces in the cabinet, the
bureaucracy, state enterprises, and
domestic intelligence and police
operations. Where levels of contestation and prerogatives are both high,
democracy will be most difficult to
sustain.
After setting forth the formidable
obstacles to entrenchment of civilian
rule, Stepan concludes with some
recommendations for shifting the
balance of power toward democratic
forces. He urges legislatures to cultivate the skills, staff, and procedures
to monitor military and intelligence
activities, and for civilians to develop
the intellectual and technical capacity to debate military issues, so that
the armed forces cannot claim a
monopoly of expertise on security
matters.
By the same token the executive
branch needs to elaborate a comprehensive, coherent vision of the
proper role of the armed forces. It

Hemisphere. Fall1989

Review Forum

must assign them positive, professional, noninterventionist purposes.
Over the long run their educational
systems and doctrine will have to be
transformed, until the soldiers no
longer believe they have the right to
confront and overthrow civilian regimes. Somewhat paradoxically the
military must be simultaneously
removed from political roles in the
civilian sphere and integrated with
civilian leadership in the security and
intelligence fields. Until democratic
leaders can exert such controls, their
conquests over the armed services
will continue to be reversible.

Comparing Nations
Stepan tempers his generalizations
with a recognition of the idiosyncrasies and complexities of each
individual case. For example, Brazil's
experience was paradigmatic in some
respects but quite unique in others.
That authoritarian regime's fairly
statist economic policies, robust arms
export industry, two-party political
system, relatively mild human rights
record (in terms of atrocities and violations), and protracted transition
were all unusual. Stepan goes beyond
these peculiarities, however, to elicit
key features of Brazil's civilianmilitary relations that are relevant
to other countries.
The utility of his framework can
be shown in its application to Chile.
Under the rule of General Augusto
Pinochet since 1973, the military has
greatly expanded its reach, role, and
mission. In addition the armed forces
have tightly controlled every step of
the transition, adhering to the
authoritarian 1980 Constitution.
Even the unanticipated defeat of
Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite
occurred precisely according to the
junta's own rules. Relatively free
presidential and congressional elections took place in December 1989.
Nevertheless, the armed forces have
declared they do not expect elected
civilian leaders thereafter to overturn
the constitution, the authority of the
military, or the market-driven economic model.
The Chilean armed services have
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carved out a powerful future position for themselves. In terms of contestable issues they have ruled
retribution for human rights violations, interference with the military
hierarchy of command, political participation for Marxists, and socialistic
state policies as out-of-bounds. In
terms of privileges they have assigned
to their national security council the
right to overrule civilian governments. According to Stepan's logic,
that presages an explosive combination of contestation and prerogatives. In all likelihood Chilean
democracy will remain limited and
vulnerable until civilians can impose
subordinate roles for those in uniform.
Stepan thus presents a daunting
challenge to the champions of liberal
democracy in Latin America. Other
analysts have warned them that they
are unlikely to succeed unless they
can surmount the various economic,
political, and social crises that beset

them. Now Stepan reminds democrats that the first priority may be
bringing to heel the monopolizers of
coercive force. As he underscores the
enormity of that task, he describes
how other nations have mastered
similar situations.
In sum, Stepan's insightful book
will prove valuable reading for policymakers as well as analysts. Based
on original research and interviews,
it advances both our empirical
knowledge and our theoretical
understanding. For over a century
most observers have viewed the Latin
American military as an integral,
enduring actor in the region's political life. Only in the last decade have
scholars and politicians dared to suggest that the armed forces can be
definitively removed from the democratic arena. In light of the horrors
committed by military regimes in the
1970s, no topic in the hemisphere is
more important for the 1990s. .
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Sexuality and Marriage in
Colonial Latin America
Edited by Asunci6n Lavrin
This collection of original essays,
the first in English to explore
sexuality and marriage in colonial
Latin America, examine the variety
of sexual expression indifferent
periods and among persons of
different social and economic
status, the relations of the sexes as
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and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico

view of the bond that united them
and of their social obligations in
producing a family, and the

dissolution of that bond. Topics

proscribed by church and state and
the various forms of resistance to

infrequently explored in Latin
American history but discussed
here include premarital relations,
illegitimacy, consensual unions,
sexual witchcraft, spouse abuse,
and divorce.

their constraints, the couple's own

$29.95 cloth

By William H.Beezley
"The author succeeds admirably in
opening a window to the minds of
turn-of-the-century Mexicans
pursuing the elusive idea of
progress. A delightfully written,
unique example of what social
history is about." - Library Journal.
"Important but neglected themes of

Mexican history are rescued and,
what ismore, related to a stimulating thesis concerning Mexico's
development during crucial pre-

revolutionary years." - Southwestern Historical Quarterly. "Witty,
entertaining, and thought-provoking." - Thomas Benjamin,
American Historical Review.
"William Beezley significantly adds
to our understanding of elite and
folk culture in Mexico during the
Porfiriato." - Harold E.Hinds, Jr.,
The Americas.
Now available in paperback.
$8.95 paper $19.95 cloth

Please write for our catalog of Latin American studies

Nebraska

The University of Nebraska Press 901 N 17 Lincoln 68588 0520

Hemisphere Fall 1989

The Latin American Cinema
by MarianGoslinga

n Latin America the cinema has reflected not only the area's rich cultural heritage but also its political outlook.
Thus the bibliographical output on the cinema says much about both dimensions of Latin American society.
Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have long enjoyed a vibrant film industry, and their movies have played to worldwide audiences. Yet smaller countries such as Venezuela have also produced notable endeavors in the field.
Basic research on the subject cannot be properly conducted without consultingJulianne Burton's comprehensive and ground-breaking bibliography of sources, published in 1983. This work has not been updated, although
current treatises on individual countries do exist.
What follows is a selective list of new publications, which is intended to serve as an invitation to further study on the
Latin American cinema.

Apertura cinematogrfica. Paola
Costa. Universidad Aut6noma de
Puebla, 1988. 208p.

Cine de la violencia. Isabel Sdnchez
Mendez, ed. Universidad Nacional
de Colombia, 1987. 4 59p. $9.95.

The Cinema of Underdevelopment.
H. M. Geduld. The Humanist,v. 48

Arturo Ripstein habla de su cine
con Emilio Garcia Riera.
Universidad de Guadalajara, 1988.

Cine en Costa Rica, 1903-1920.
DanielMarranghello.San Jose:
Marranghello, 1988. 240p. $12.00.

Comunicaci6n social, poder y
democracia en Mexico. Pablo
Arredondo Ramirez, Enrique E.
Sanchez Ruiz. Universidad de
Guadalajara, 1986. 214p.

315p. $21.35.
Brazilian Cinema. RandalJohnson.
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,

1988. 373p.
Catlogo del nuevo cine argentino.
DanielL6pez. Buenos Aires:
Cinematografia, 1987. 282p. $7.50.
Censura cinematogrnfica en
Venezuela. Antonio D. Trujillo.
Universidad de Los Andes, 1988.

271p.

Cine latinoamericano: economia y
nuevas t cnicas audiovisuales.
Octavio Getino. Caracas: Latinoamericano, 1987. 278p. $16.00.
Cine San Juan. L. Kardish. American
Film, v. 14 (March 1989), p.16 -18 .
Cine Sandino. G. Fuller. Film
Comment, v. 25 (January/February
1989), p.24 .

Central America: Film and Video.
J. Hess.Journalof Film and Video,
v. 40, no. 4 (1988), p.37-57.

Cine sudamericano: directorio de
directores. Luis Trelles Plazaola.
University of Puerto Rico Press,

Cine argentino: diccionario de
realizadores contemporineos.
Jorge A. Martin. Buenos Aires:
Cinematografia, 1987. 210p. $7.80.

Cine venezolano. Edmundo Aray,
Vicencio Pereira.Universidad de Los
Andes, 1987. 184p. $15.00.

MarianGoslinga is the Latin
American and Caribbeanlibrarianat
FloridaInternationalUniversity.
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1986.

Cinema and Social Change in
Latin America: Conversations with
Filmmakers.Julianne Burton.
University of Texas Press, 1986.

320p.

(May/June 1988), p.35 -3 6 .

Cracks in the Macho Monolith:
Machismo, Man, and Mexico in
Recent Mexican Cinema. C. Berg.
New Orleans Review, v. 16, no. 1
(1989), p.6 7-74 .
Cronologia de la cultura
cinematogrifica, 1849-1986. Quito:
Cultura, 1987. 101p. $6.95. [Film in
Ecuador.]
The Cuban Image: Cinema and
Cultural Politics in Cuba. Michael
Chanan.Indiana University Press,

1986.320p.
Current Cinema in Latin America.
G. Gauthier. Revue du cinema, no. 417
(1986), p.8 3 -8 5 .
Exiles and Emigres: Crosscurrents
in Cinema from the 1890s to the
1980s. Julianne Burton. Intellectual
Migrations: TransculturalContributions
of European and Latin American
Emigres (Papersof the 31st annual

meeting of the Seminar on the
Acquisition of Latin American Library
Materials,edited by IlianaL. Sonntag),
SALALM, University of WisconsinMadison, 1987. p.3 9 -4 5 . [Seminar held
at the Ibero-Amerikanischen Institut,
Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin,

Germany, April 20-25, 1986.]
The Film Industry in Brazil: Culture
and the State. RandalJohnson.
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987.

288p.
Films with a Purpose: A Puerto
Rican Experiment in Social Films.
Papo Colo. New York, NY- Exit Art,
1987. 48p.
Gui6n cinematogrfico para la
rama de comunicaciones: cine y TV.
Vicente Gonzales-AramayoZuleta.
Cruso: Mena, 1988. 159p. [The
Bolivian cinema.]
Historia cinematografica chilena:
desafios y realidad. Alejo Alvarez,
Mariade la Luz Hurtado, eds.
Santiago, Chile: Centro de
Indagaci6n y Expresi6n Cultural
y Artistica, 1987. 65p. $6.00.
Historia del cine latinoamericano.
PeterB. Schumann. Buenos Aires:

Legasa, 1987. 356p. $12.20.
[Translated from the German.]
Historia y filmograffa del cine
uruguayo. Eugenio Hintz, Graciela
Dacosta.Montevideo: Ediciones
de la Plaza, 1988. 107p.
Hojas del cine: testimonio y
documentos del nuevo cine
latinoamericano. Fundaci6n
Mexicana de Cineastas,ed. Mexico:
Secretaria de Educaci6n Publica,
1988. 3 vols. $17.00.

Hollywood Hits Havana. C. Norton,
S. Faigenbaum. MotherJones, v. 13
(June 1988), p.53 -5 4 .
A Latin American Filmography.
Gayle Williams. The CentralAmerican
Connection. Library Resources and
Access (Papersof the 28th annual
meeting of the Seminar on the
Acquisition of Latin American Library
Materials, edited by Jane Garner),
SALALM, University of WisconsinMadison, 1985, p.17 7-2 15 . [Seminar
co-sponsored by the University of
Kansas and the Universidadde Costa
Rica and held in San Jos6, Costa
Rica, June 30-July 4, 1983. Features
useful date and geographic indexes.]
Medio siglo de cine mexicano,
1896-1947. Aurelio de los Reyes.

Mexico: Trillas, 1987. 225p.
Memorias y notas del cine
venezolano, 1897-1959. Ricardo
Tirado, ed. Caracas: Distribuidora
VBS, 1987. 300p. $40.00.
M6xico visto por el cine extranjero,
1941-1969. Emilio GarciaRiera,ed.
Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1988. 3 vols.
The Movies and the Masses in Cuba.
Patricia Aufderheide. Latin American
Masses and Minorities:Their Images
and Realities (Papersof the 30th
annualmeeting of the Seminaron the
Acquisition of Latin American Library
Materials,edited by Dan C. Hazen),
SALALM, University of WisconsinMadison, 1987, v. 1, p.3 2 7-33 3 .
[seminar held at Princeton
University,June 19-23, 1985.]

The New Latin American Cinema:
An Annotated Bibliography of
Sources in English, Spanish, and
Portuguese, 1960-1980.Julianne
Burton, ed. Smyrna Press, 1983. 80p.
[Includes a useful listing of Latin
American and English-language
periodicals that regularly cover Latin
American cinema.]
Nieto's Show. E. Stein. Film
Comment, v. 23 (January-February
1989), p.4. [Cartagena Film Festival.]
The Nineteen Hundred EightySeven (1987) Festival of New Latin
American Cinema in Havana.
E Aufderheide. Film Content, v. 24,

no. 2 (1988), p.2 .

Nova legislaio cinematogrifica
nacional: resoluidos do CONCINE,
leis federais, decretos, decretos-leis,
portarias.Jose Augusto Lemos de
Almeida. Forense, 1987. 579p.
Our Man in Havana. J. Greenberg.
American Film, v. 14 (March 1989),

p.16-18.
Plano secuencia de la memoria
de Chile: veinticinco afios de cine
chileno, 1960-1985.Jacqueline
Moeusca. Santiago, Chile: Litoral,
1988. 204p. $17.70.
Reviewing Histories: Selections
from New Latin American
Cinema. GlauberRocha. Buffalo, NYHallwalls, Incorporated,
Contemporary Arts Center, 1987

224p.

Narraci6n audiovisual en Venezuela,
1973-1983. Oscar Garaycochea. Fondo
de Fomento Cinematografico, 1986.

A Surge of Vitality for the Cinema
of Post-Dictatorial Argentina.
G. Spagnoletti. Cineform, v. 27, no. 12

255p.

(1987), p.5-7.
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New and Recent Books on Latin America
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Tom J. Farer
In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on
such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy In this
fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key
assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin
America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America
(he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as
unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated
analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.
$39.95
448 pp.
ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth)

THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans
This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and
Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three
of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology Gino Germani
(Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans
points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that
have passed. Rather the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of
modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.
$24.95
ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth)
$14.95
240pp.
ISBN: 0-88738-700-4 (paper)

POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz
In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and
democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador Martz uses a textured and
detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's
petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalistic struggle against multinational
pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.
ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth)
432 pp.
$34.95

REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra
This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor
Paz Estenssoro in November 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an
account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an
interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among
various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an
analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends conceming the questions of regime formation and
transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region
during this period.
$29.95
256 pp.
ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth)
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